Fez Administrative Court Overturns University Registration Fee Decision
The Administrative Court of Appeal in Fez has made a significant ruling recently by annulling the decision of the Primary Court of Oujda, which had previously invalidated the university council's imposition of registration fees on working students pursuing doctoral studies. This ruling comes shortly after a similar decision by the court, which had also suspended the university's enforcement of registration fees for students in flexible study programs, thus temporarily concluding a highly contentious chapter in what has been described as the commodification of public education.
Overview of the Case
The case traces back to November 19, 2025, when the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Administrative Court in Oujda, located in eastern Morocco. The plaintiff claimed that she applied to pursue doctoral studies at the Faculty of Sciences based on the university’s announcement for the academic year 2025/2026. After her acceptance, she submitted her application for registration but was met with rejection by the registration officer on the grounds that she did not provide proof of payment for the annual registration fees, which were set at 15,000 dirhams (approximately $1,500) for employed students, pursuant to a decision by the university council dated October 1, 2025. The plaintiff sought to annul this decision.
On December 23, 2025, the court responded to her request by annulling the university council's decision. However, the university administration contested the ruling, leading the case to the Administrative Court of Appeal in Fez, which ultimately overturned the initial ruling and rejected the plaintiff's request.
The Administrative Court of Appeal grounded its decision on three main arguments: the university council's authority in managing the institution's resources, the absence of a violation of the principle of non-retroactivity of administrative decisions, and the lack of an acquired right for the plaintiff that would prevent the application of the fees.
Firstly, the court rejected the basis of the primary court's ruling, which argued that imposing registration fees falls under the jurisdiction of establishing public costs and taxes that the law must approve. The court clarified that these fees are associated with the fundamental training of doctoral studies within a flexible time framework aimed at employees, rather than being a tax that contributes to the state budget.
Moreover, the court referenced Law No. 01.00 regarding the organization of higher education, particularly articles 11, 12, and 18, which define the university councils' responsibilities in managing financial and administrative affairs. Additionally, it cited a joint decision from August 18, 2025, by the Minister of Higher Education and the Minister Delegate to the Minister of Economy and Finance concerning the management of self-generated resources for public higher education institutions. The court determined that the registration fees for employed students in basic doctoral training were classified as self-generated financial resources for universities.
The court noted that these fees are linked to a type of training scheduled outside regular working hours, accommodating the professional circumstances of employed students, while also covering additional compensation for educational and administrative staff for extra hours worked. Consequently, the court concluded that the university council's decision fell within its legal and regulatory authority.
Secondly, the court affirmed that imposing registration fees on employed students does not violate the principle of non-retroactivity of administrative decisions. It distinguished between impairing legal statuses and the effects that were established prior to the issuance of the administrative decision versus altering the effects related to legal situations that are provisional and subject to change.
It asserted that the determination of registration fees, which was issued on October 1, 2025, is based on the ministerial decision from August 18 of the same year, and pertains to legal situations that arose after this regulatory text was enacted. Therefore, the application of fees did not contravene the principle of non-retroactivity.
Thirdly, the court dismissed the argument regarding acquired rights, stating that merely participating in the doctoral admission examination does not create an acquired right to pursue studies. Such a right only materializes after the final announcement of accepted candidates. It pointed out that the electronic preliminary registration for the 2025-2026 academic year occurred between September 18 and 26, 2025, while the decision to establish fees was made on October 1 of the same year, prior to the final announcement of admissions.
From this, the court deduced that the plaintiff had not secured a legal status that would prevent the establishment of training fees and noted that the decision was made before the expiration of the sixty-day period for contesting it.
Based on these considerations, the Administrative Court of Appeal concluded that the initial judgment was incorrect, leading to its annulment and the rejection of the annulment request.
As reported by legal-agenda.com.
In parallel with the legal battle against the commodification of higher education, protests by employed students continue against the decision. With the start of the current academic year, many Moroccan universities have witnessed marches and sit-ins in response to calls from student coordinations expressing their rejection of these fees, deeming them burdensome for groups attempting to balance their professional and social commitments with their academic aspirations amid rising living costs and declining purchasing power. They have announced a boycott of registration until the decision is retracted.
The significance of the ruling published by "legal-agenda.com" extends beyond the dispute regarding the fee amount, touching upon the legal boundaries of the financial independence of public universities and the compatibility of their self-management with guarantees related to the right to education. While the court relied on a regulatory text that incorporates registration fees into the self-generated financial resources of universities, the question remains whether this justification is sufficient to impose additional financial burdens on a category of students and whether the university council's decision respects the higher legal standards governing public education, which are anchored in the constitution guaranteeing access to higher education for all.
This issue necessitates distinguishing between the legitimacy of the university's authority to manage its financial resources and the extent to which this authority extends to imposing fees on students, on one hand, and the social impacts of these fees on equal opportunities and access to training and scientific research, on the other hand. Even with the acknowledgment of the university's right to seek sources to diversify its financial resources within the legal framework, this does not exempt it from the necessity of relying on a clear legal foundation or considering the proportionality between the nature of the training and the imposed costs, preventing the economic or professional status of the student from becoming a factor of exclusion.
Moreover, the court's reasoning regarding the absence of an acquired right raises questions about the timing of announcing the financial conditions for accessing university training. The fact that a candidate does not acquire a final right to registration merely by applying does not, by itself, resolve the issue of whether transparency and legal security are respected, especially when new fees are established after the admission process has begun. A clear and prior announcement of financial conditions is an essential element enabling candidates to make informed decisions regarding their resulting obligations.
From another perspective, the ruling raises the issue of equality before public service and the legitimacy of financial discrimination among students based on their professional status or the study system they follow. Employed students and employees who lack the financial means to pay these fees will face a real dilemma in the absence of a viable alternative for pursuing their studies for free. Their professional status naturally directs their applications towards the paid flexible study programs, potentially leading to the exclusion of those unable to afford the costs from continuing their academic journey. This paradox calls for an in-depth institutional discussion: how can the right to higher education be guaranteed for individuals striving to balance work and academic achievement if their access to available pathways is contingent on their ability to bear financial burdens that may exceed their means?
Thus, the debate transcends the legitimacy of a specific university decision, posing a broader challenge regarding how to reconcile the requirements of sustainable funding for public universities with their mission to make knowledge accessible, promote scientific research, and develop competencies. The financial independence of the university should not be divorced from its social function, and ensuring the right to education does not negate the necessity for sufficient resources to enhance educational quality.
