A consulting firm commissioned to evaluate the phosphate imports from the occupied Western Sahara to New Zealand has concluded that there is no issue concerning these transactions. However, a closer examination of the publicly available summary of the assessment reveals a starkly different narrative. The report, produced by the New Zealand consulting company Tūhana Business and Human Rights, asserts that the importation of phosphate rock from this disputed territory aligns with international human rights standards. Yet, the analysis appears to overlook key aspects of international law and misapplies human rights principles, potentially legitimizing one of the longest-standing unresolved occupations in the world. This assessment was commissioned by the Fertiliser Association of New Zealand (FANZ), which consists of two members actively importing phosphate rock from the Western Sahara.
For decades, these New Zealand agricultural cooperatives have sourced phosphate rock from the Bou-Craa mine in Western Sahara, a region recognized by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory lacking administrative authority. The International Court of Justice has concluded that Morocco does not possess sovereignty over this land, acknowledging the right to self-determination of the Sahrawi people—a conclusion reaffirmed by various international courts in recent years. However, this crucial context is conspicuously absent from Tūhana's evaluation.
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of Tūhana's treatment of the right to self-determination is its characterization. The report diminishes this fundamental human right to a mere 'political dispute' that precedes and transcends business operations. Such a portrayal is not only questionable but fundamentally incompatible with international law. The right to self-determination is a cornerstone of international law, enshrined in the United Nations Charter and upheld by judicial bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice. These institutions have consistently ruled that Western Sahara is distinct from Morocco, necessitating the consent of the Sahrawi people for any economic activities that exploit its resources.
By treating this basic right as an issue outside the realm of corporate responsibility, Tūhana effectively removes the central theme from its analysis, thereby undermining the human rights framework it purports to apply. The report concludes that New Zealand import companies do not 'cause' or 'contribute' to harm but are merely 'directly linked' to potential impacts. This assertion is made without substantiation in the publicly available assessment.
Extracting and exporting a finite resource from an occupied territory without the consent of its people is not a neutral transaction. It generates revenue, maintains infrastructure, and legitimizes the presence of the occupying power. Under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, such involvement raises serious questions about complicity in harm, particularly in contexts where economic activities may entrench unlawful situations.
Tūhana's narrow interpretation poses a risk of setting a dangerous precedent, allowing corporations to remain passive participants in occupation economies without bearing any responsibility. In 2018, South Africa's Supreme Court ruled that a phosphate shipment exported from Western Sahara to New Zealand was illegally acquired, as the Sahrawi people did not consent to the trade. Numerous international investors, including Norway's sovereign wealth fund, reached similar conclusions, prompting publicly traded companies worldwide to cease such trades.
While the report acknowledges restrictions on freedom of expression in Western Sahara, it continues to rely on stakeholder engagement processes conducted under Moroccan control. This stakeholder process conflates consultation with consent, undermining the fundamental requirement that the consent of the local population is paramount. Consulting processes carried out in a repressive environment cannot fulfill this requirement. By lowering this threshold, the assessment risks providing a blueprint for circumventing fundamental rights in politically sensitive contexts.
Notably, the report suggests that halting phosphate extraction could harm local communities by reducing jobs and investments. This argument follows a familiar pattern: economic dependency is leveraged to justify continued exploitation. However, international law does not permit fundamental rights to be traded for short-term economic gains—especially when such benefits arise from an unlawful situation. Implying otherwise risks normalizing the very structures that sustain the occupation.
Tūhana's report explicitly distances itself from a legal analysis. However, human rights due diligence cannot be conducted in a legal vacuum. The assessment fails to engage meaningfully with the status of Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory, the laws of occupation, and the growing jurisprudence rejecting the exploitation of resources without consent. Without this legal context, the report's conclusions lack credibility.
Beyond the content of the assessment, serious questions arise regarding its independence. Tim Gibson, the director of Tūhana, has also served as both director and chair of Port Otago Ltd, a port company that receives phosphate rock from Western Sahara. This dual role raises concerns about a potential conflict of interest. Even in the absence of direct financial gain, the overlap between advising on the legality of phosphate imports and overseeing infrastructure that facilitates and profits from those imports raises questions about impartiality.
In the realm of business and human rights, where credibility hinges on independence, this should be significant. The published report from Tūhana does not clearly disclose how such conflicts were managed. The controversy surrounding Port Otago's role in exploiting Western Sahara has been known for years.
The Tūhana assessment provides companies importing phosphate from Western Sahara with a false sense of security by disregarding the right to self-determination, limiting the scope of corporate responsibility, undermining the standard of consent, and overlooking the legal framework surrounding the occupation. Consequently, it risks achieving the opposite of what human rights due diligence is meant to ensure. Instead of protecting the rights of the Sahrawi people, the report may contribute to their ongoing marginalization.
Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) has requested that Tūhana clarify its methodology, articulate its legal arguments, and respond to detailed questions regarding its conclusions. Despite sending letters on March 16, 2023, and February 21, 2024, the only response was a brief statement from Tim Gibson on behalf of Tūhana in 2023, indicating that 'work with our clients continues, and we will engage with stakeholders in due course.' Our letter to Tūhana on April 9, 2026, announcing the publication of this article prompted a response, but it did not address any of the raised questions. The reply stated, 'We assume that FANZ sought both legal advice for procurement as well as our advice on the application of the UNGPs [United Nations Guiding Principles] to procurement. We stand by our findings. Your readers will find a summary of these findings in a statement available here.'
This response completely ignores that our questions were based on the very summary of findings to which they referred. WSRW wrote to the Fertiliser Association of New Zealand on April 9, 2026, but received no reply. Our letter to Ballance Agri-Nutrients on April 9, 2026, resulted in a non-substantive response for the first time since 2014, directing us to their own position page on Western Sahara, which had initially prompted several of the questions posed.
Moreover, WSRW has inquired of Tim Gibson—who had commented on the assessment to WSRW in 2023—about how conflicts of interest were handled and managed. Gibson responded on April 21, 2026, stating, 'I have always disclosed my connection to Tūhana to Port Otago' and that 'I was not personally involved in the assessment.' WSRW also asked Port Otago on April 15, 2026—where Gibson has served as director and chair since 2016—how much the company has earned through the trade. The port has not responded.
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Members of the European Parliament from across the political spectrum have sharply criticized the European Commission for its handling of trade relations between the EU and Morocco, which also impact the occupied Western Sahara, raising concerns regarding legality, transparency, and the apparent disregard for the role of Parliament. At its 2026 annual meeting, Siemens Energy defended its commitment to wind energy projects in the occupied Western Sahara. Morocco's ambitions to become a global hub for green hydrogen are gaining momentum, but it is leasing land in a territory that it legally does not own. Furthermore, Morocco aims to position itself as a key supplier of strategic minerals to Western powers and has signed a new agreement with the United States that encompasses the waters of Western Sahara and the critical minerals found there.
As reported by wsrw.org.
