Political Tensions and Strategic Relationships
In a striking development within Spain's foreign policy, José Manuel Albares, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has labeled the Popular Party (PP) as an "anti-Moroccan" entity amidst a growing verbal escalation that transcends typical governmental disputes. Albares argues that the PP is transforming Spain's foreign relations—particularly its ties with Morocco—into tools for internal political conflict. This rising tension has been exacerbated by recent statements from both current and former PP leaders, prompting Albares to accuse the opposition of being a "hindrance" to Spain's foreign policy.
However, beneath this political skirmish lies a deeper issue. Since 2022, Spain and Morocco have cultivated a strategic partnership anchored in migration cooperation, economic ties, trade, law enforcement, and security matters. This collaboration has now expanded to include a joint bid, alongside Portugal, for the 2030 World Cup. In December 2025, both nations further strengthened their bilateral framework with fourteen new cooperation agreements and a joint declaration aimed at enhancing political dialogue.
The PP has aspirations of governing Spain, and should they succeed, they will inherit this complex relationship. The critical question remains: what approach will they take towards it?
The Sahara Conflict: A Double-Edged Sword
The Sahara issue stands out as a significant conundrum for the PP. When Pedro Sánchez announced in March 2022 that Spain viewed Morocco's autonomy initiative as "the most serious, credible, and realistic basis" for a solution, the PP seized this shift as a prime argument against the government. Alberto Núñez Feijóo, leader of the PP, condemned what he termed a breach of decades of consensus in Spanish foreign policy, particularly criticizing the lack of consultation with the main opposition party before this pivotal decision. Since then, the PP's public stance has been markedly more ambiguous compared to the government, advocating for respect for international law and United Nations resolutions without explicitly endorsing the government's support for Morocco's autonomy initiative.
The PP's historical position on the Sahara has not always been consistent. During Mariano Rajoy's administration, Spain maintained a cautious yet non-confrontational approach towards Morocco's proposal. Internally, the PP has also contained divergent views, with some leaders supporting a strategic relationship with Rabat while others lean more towards the separatists' perspectives. This internal contradiction became pronounced in July 2025 when a supposed representative of the Polisario separatist front attended the PP’s national congress, stirring controversy and raising doubts in Morocco regarding the potential stance of a future Feijóo-led government.
The situation intensified in February 2026, when Albares accused the PP of maintaining a double standard—one in Spain and another in dealings with Moroccan authorities. According to the minister, the PP was sending "emissaries" to Morocco to covertly back the position they publicly criticized regarding the Sahara. If this accusation holds true, the PP faces a significant dilemma: while it can leverage the Sahara issue to undermine Sánchez from the opposition, it will need to manage the diplomatic repercussions of reversing Spain's established policy towards Morocco once in power.
The current international landscape differs substantially from that of March 2022. Since Sánchez's announcement, Morocco's autonomy initiative has gained considerable international support, and the Sahara issue has evolved within the United Nations framework. For the PP, reversing Spain's position would entail more than merely changing a statement in a diplomatic communiqué; it would involve reopening one of the most sensitive issues in Spanish-Moroccan relations. The pressing question remains whether a Feijóo government would uphold Spain's current position on the Sahara or revert to pre-March 2022 policies. Thus far, the PP has shied away from providing a clear answer.
Furthermore, the Sahara is not the only source of friction between the PP and Morocco. Recently, the PP has also hardened its rhetoric on immigration and access to certain benefits in light of increasing electoral competition with Vox, a far-right party. The most notable instance occurred in April 2026 when the concept of "national priority" entered the Spanish political debate. Historically linked to far-right movements in Europe and championed by Vox in Spain, this concept advocates prioritizing nationals over foreigners in accessing specific public aid and services. The ensuing debate forced the PP to clarify its stance following Vox's push for this initiative in Congress and its incorporation into regional political agreements. The controversy even sparked tensions within the PP itself, with factions concerned about the political and legal ramifications of adopting terminology associated with far-right ideology.
In response to these pressures, the PP has attempted to present nuanced positions. Popular leader Jaime de los Santos stated that "any regularized immigrant has exactly the same rights as those born here," while other party members have preferred terms like "roots" or "residential priority." Nevertheless, this debate has sent a significant political signal, indicating that Vox is successfully influencing the agenda of Spain's main right-wing party.
The overarching challenge for the PP can be encapsulated in a paradox: while they can utilize Morocco and the Sahara to attack Pedro Sánchez from the opposition, governing necessitates daily management of one of Spain's most crucial and intricate foreign relations. The incompatibility of these two stances could become evident to Feijóo if he ascends to La Moncloa, as many of the decisions he currently criticizes are rooted in strategic realities that no Spanish government can afford to overlook. Cooperation with Morocco is not merely an ideological choice for the PSOE; it is also dictated by geography, economics, security, and a growing web of shared interests. Consequently, the most likely outcome may not be a complete rupture but rather a dissonance between opposition rhetoric and governing policy, leaving the PP to navigate the complex relationship with Rabat while explaining to its electorate why it has not reversed long-criticized decisions.
Albares's accusation regarding the supposed "emissaries" sent by the PP to Morocco highlights this possibility: that the party may be far more pragmatic in private than its public discourse suggests. Therefore, the salient question is not just whether the PP is truly "anti-Moroccan" as asserted by the current Foreign Minister, but rather how far the leading opposition party is willing to exploit its relationship with the neighboring country for electoral gain against both the PSOE and Vox, and what aspects of this discourse it would genuinely be prepared to formalize into state policy upon assuming power.
Spain will remain Morocco's closest European neighbor, and Morocco will continue to be an indispensable strategic partner for Madrid, regardless of who is in power. This is precisely why the current contradictions within the PP are significant. Should Alberto Núñez Feijóo reach La Moncloa, he will not inherit a blank slate; instead, he will encounter a profoundly transformed bilateral relationship, an established Spanish position on the Sahara integrated into a new international reality, solidified security cooperation, and a 2030 World Cup that necessitates collaboration between the two nations in the coming years.
Feijóo will then face a choice between two paths: either translate the opposition rhetoric into governing policy, risking the onset of a new period of uncertainty with Rabat, or acknowledge that the relationship with Morocco demands a pragmatism that the PP has not always publicly recognized. This decision could become one of the first significant tests of foreign policy for a potential Feijóo administration.
As reported by es.le360.ma.
