U.S. Strategy to Diminish Iranian Influence in the Region
The American administration, in coordination with the United Nations, is intensifying diplomatic efforts to resolve the longstanding Maghreb conflict before the end of the year. This initiative is grounded in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2797, which endorses granting autonomy to the Sahara region under Moroccan sovereignty, while dismantling the Tindouf camps and allowing their residents to return to their homeland. According to informed American sources, resolving this conflict, which has persisted for over fifty years, has become a strategic priority in Washington, not only due to Maghreb interests but also because of its direct link to U.S. national security in three interconnected environments: the Middle East, Africa, and the southern Mediterranean. These sources further suggest that the continuation of this conflict creates a fertile ground for the expansion of Iranian influence across the region.
Complex Regional Dynamics and U.S. Interests
Moreover, the same sources indicated a significant overlap between the commencement of negotiations between Lebanese and Israeli delegations, facilitated by President Trump, and the sessions of the UN Security Council dedicated to the Sahara issue. The Security Council held two closed sessions on April 24 and April 30, focusing on ending the conflict and dismantling the camps, while addressing the disarmament of the "Polisario Front," which U.S. entities accuse of receiving training and arms through channels linked to Hezbollah, although these allegations have yet to be substantiated with documented evidence.
Despite the differing contexts of the Arab Mashriq and North Africa, they converge within a new strategic security framework that Washington is rapidly establishing. This framework is based on a central principle: limiting engagement and negotiations to recognized state governments while excluding non-state actors—whether religiously motivated armed factions or politically claimed movements operating outside internationally acknowledged institutional frameworks—from major settlement equations. In this regard, Iran is viewed as a supporter of Hezbollah, which implies that the Lebanese arena has become a card in a broader regional equation that does not necessarily serve pure Lebanese interests.
Regarding the Sahara issue, some analytical circles have raised questions about the nature of the relationship between Tehran and the Polisario Front, especially given the historical tensions between Iran and Morocco, particularly post-Iranian revolution. Ultimately, it appears that Washington prefers direct dealings with Morocco and Algeria as the principal parties in this protracted conflict, which intertwines Cold War remnants with regional power calculations between two competing neighbors. This trajectory reflects an American conviction that any lasting settlement can only be achieved through the directly involved parties, devoid of any external power agendas.
European capitals recognize that "stabilizing Lebanon and settling the Moroccan Sahara dispute would weaken Iranian influence across the Middle East and North Africa." Paris believes that strengthening the legitimate state in Lebanon and launching reconstruction projects would restore the economic, political, and tourism roles of the Cedar country to what they were before 1983, thus contributing to a more secure, stable, and prosperous Middle East. In the Maghreb, resolving the Sahara issue opens the door to revitalizing the historical integration project aspired to by successive generations.
Ultimately, sources indicate that achieving a settlement for the North African conflict, which has endured without resolution for half a century, would alleviate burdens on the American administration concerning more complex regional files, primarily reducing the operational influence of Hezbollah and allowing for a more independent Lebanese role in the new Middle Eastern framework that Washington is delineating.
In this context, Senator Ted Cruz has warned that the growing network of Iranian relations with armed factions in the Sahel and North Africa could lead to the region resembling a haven for armed models similar to the Houthi model in Yemen. Cruz believes that strategically defeating Iran necessitates first dismantling its regional extensions and neutralizing traditional resistance states in its vicinity, including Algeria. Recent developments in the Sahel highlight the interconnected stakes in this geography; for instance, northern Mali has witnessed violent confrontations between the Malian army and a militia coalition comprising the Azawad separatist movement and elements of the Jama’a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, resulting in hundreds of casualties and the militia's control over cities and villages in the north following the withdrawal of Russian Wagner forces from the area.
These conflicts cannot be isolated from their broader context; the region has become a stage for proxy wars intersecting multiple international and regional agendas, with eyes on mineral wealth, energy resources, and strategic trade routes. This makes security in the Sahel organically linked to broader equations that extend from the European Mediterranean shores, keen on securing energy and migration routes, to Washington, which seeks to redraw the influence map across the entire region.
As reported by majalla.com.
