Morocco's Authoritarian Surveillance Practices Unveiled
A recent report by Amnesty International, titled "We Start with the Verdict," reveals that Moroccan authorities are systematically combining digital and analog surveillance methods to monitor, intimidate, and persecute journalists, activists, and other critics, thereby violating their rights to privacy, freedom of expression, assembly, and association. Morocco has fully embraced techno-authoritarian practices and acquired a wide array of surveillance technologies to establish a repressive system specifically designed to instill fear in human rights activists and journalists, silence their voices, and obstruct their work both within Morocco and abroad.
Despite Morocco's consistent denial of using spyware, whistleblower testimonies, leaked data, and corporate materials indicate otherwise. The surveillance tools used in Morocco are sourced from companies in Israel, the EU, and the USA, including the infamous NSO Group, the now-defunct Italian spyware company Hacking Team (now Memento Labs), and the British-German firm networks Gamma Group and FinFisher. Victims have been targeted through various methods, including device infections, one-click and zero-click attacks, and network injections via Maroc Telecom's infrastructure.
Widespread Implications of Surveillance on Human Rights
This repressive ecosystem makes it perilous for individuals in Morocco to exercise their rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. The Moroccan authorities must immediately cease the unlawful surveillance of human rights defenders and journalists. Amnesty International's report specifically identifies the Direction Générale de la Surveillance du Territoire (DGST), Morocco's domestic intelligence agency, as responsible for deploying Pegasus spyware, with extensive documented abuses against activists and journalists between 2017 and 2021, despite previous denials from Moroccan officials.
A former DGST employee, who goes by the pseudonym Safir, provided Amnesty International with insights into internal operations through multiple interviews over the years. Amnesty corroborated key statements with independent sources, technical evidence, and interviews with human rights defenders. Safir described how targets were covertly filmed and listened to in detention, offices, cars, cafes, and even their bedrooms. He revealed that mobile phone shops were coerced into selling already infected devices from DGST agents and that neighbors were recruited as informants. These tactics not only affect the targeted activists but also extend to their families, friends, and professional networks.
The tools employed are diverse, but the objective is clear: to blackmail, discredit, tarnish reputations, and unjustly imprison those advocating for human rights in Morocco. Rebecca White stated, "Ultimately, there is practically no place for human rights defenders in Morocco to hide, and no way to escape the all-encompassing state surveillance network that even extends beyond Morocco's borders." Safir noted that individuals traveling through Moroccan airports were routinely monitored, and entire internet cafes were infiltrated with spyware. Remote-controlled spyware (RCS) was used to track calls, read messages, access photos, and record audio. In addition to phone surveillance, authorities secretly installed microphones and other recording devices in private spaces to eavesdrop on conversations.
For instance, journalist Omar Radi, who faced harassment for his reporting on corruption and human rights abuses and was later imprisoned, was surveilled via tiny microphones hidden in his apartment lamps. He reported, "As soon as I speak in public, as soon as I write a Facebook post, as soon as I post something on Instagram, they scrutinize every one of my movements; they insult me. They are not media – they are instruments of terror." The suspicion that personal and domestic spaces are being spied upon has severe psychological impacts on human rights defenders.
In 2021, long-time human rights activist Fouad Abdelmoumni was secretly filmed with his fiancée, and the video was circulated via WhatsApp. "When I saw the videos of me and my partner in bed, the location and angle of the recording were clearly identifiable. It must have been the air conditioning unit. I checked but found nothing, so I concluded that they could easily install and remove it. The quality of the image and sound was very good, even in the dark, so the equipment must have been very sophisticated," he stated. Safir confirmed Abdelmoumni's account, labeling it a "textbook example" of a surveillance and cleanup operation by the DGST designed to leave no trace.
According to the report, the DGST has been using Pegasus (NSO Group) since September 2017, internally referred to in Morocco as "Morning." Amnesty identified 103 phone numbers of potential targets, which included 34 human rights defenders, 22 journalists, five lawyers, and four scholars, along with 25 politicians/public officials and five diplomats or representatives of international organizations. The remaining eight included businessmen, religious figures, and others whose identities or classifications were unclear. These records indicate that the phone numbers of prominent human rights defenders and journalists were among the first entered into the Pegasus system, suggesting that this was the primary purpose for which the DGST acquired the highly invasive spyware system.
"Collectively, these findings provide strong evidence that Morocco was responsible for an extensive cross-border Pegasus surveillance campaign against critical journalists, activists, lawyers, and politicians," stated Donncha Ó Cearbhaill. Four weeks prior to releasing their report, Amnesty International reached out in writing to the Moroccan authorities but received no response. Morocco's surveillance practices and many of the tools used violate international human rights norms and standards. Morocco must immediately halt the surveillance of human rights defenders and journalists who are lawfully exercising their human rights. The Moroccan judicial authorities must ensure an independent and effective investigation into all reported cases of unlawful surveillance by the DGST.
Furthermore, states must cease the export of spyware, digital forensic tools, and other technologies that infringe upon privacy to Morocco until a system of human rights guarantees is established that can effectively prevent human rights violations in practice. This research was conducted as part of a collaboration coordinated by "Forbidden Stories" with 14 media organizations and builds on the work of Moroccan investigative journalist Hicham Mansouri, who is himself a victim of the Moroccan surveillance apparatus and currently lives in exile in France. In 2015, he was imprisoned on charges of "adultery" and "sexual exploitation" following a trial that did not meet international standards. He reported to Amnesty International how surveillance leads to self-censorship.
As reported by amnesty.at.
