Annual Conflict Probability Between Spain and Morocco
The Spanish Naval Think Tank (CdPN), an institution affiliated with the Spanish Naval War College, has conducted an analysis estimating the annual probability of conflict between Spain and Morocco to be between 1% and 2%. This assessment was articulated by retired Marine Colonel Juan López Díaz in an article published on October 5, focusing on the strategic significance of the Gibraltar Strait. In his evaluation, Colonel López Díaz deemed the risk of military confrontation between Spain and the United Kingdom to be significantly lower, estimating it at less than 0.1% per year. He noted that such an eventuality would likely lead to the closure of the Strait, an occurrence he described as rare, stating that "political tensions in the Strait seldom escalate to the point of causing significant disruptions in maritime transport." He projected that even a hypothetical one-week closure—considered unlikely with a probability of less than 1%—would have catastrophic economic repercussions, impacting a collective economic output of $3.5 trillion (approximately 32 trillion dirhams) and driving regional commodity prices up by 20% to 40%. He calculated that a week without access to Mediterranean refineries would create a deficit of 23 million barrels of crude oil, resulting in a surge in regional diesel prices by 15% to 25%.
Colonel López Díaz urged Madrid to remain vigilant regarding Morocco's hybrid actions aimed at undermining Spain's strategic position, asserting that Morocco is leveraging a narrative to attract other international actors, such as the United States and Israel, at the expense of Spanish interests. He pointed out that migratory flows, which have been used as a political pressure tool since 2021, peaked in July, leading to an episode described by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez as a "violation and assault on territorial integrity" after tens of thousands of individuals entered Ceuta irregularly from Morocco. The Colonel further emphasized that the Strait encapsulates the principal diplomatic disputes between Spain and both Rabat and London, which include Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla, as well as the Sahara issue, along with the surrounding islets and rocks along the African coast, and the delimitation of Moroccan southern waters and airspace.
Significance of Undersea Connections and Maritime Traffic
In an interesting revelation, Colonel López Díaz highlighted the existence of an unnoticed yet significant undersea electrical connection between Spain and Morocco, which has a cumulative capacity of 1,400 megawatts. According to him, Spanish electricity can meet between 8% and 15% of Morocco's demand, which escalates to 25% when factoring in gas from Moroccan combined cycle power plants, as the entire gas imported by the kingdom is regasified on Spanish territory. He cataloged eight undersea telecommunications cables in the region, including two from the historical Moroccan operator Maroc Telecom, such as the Atlas Offshore cable (1,634 kilometers between Asilah and Marseille without landing in Spain) and the East-Tet cable (113 kilometers between Tétouan and Estepona, co-owned with Telxius, a subsidiary of Spanish company Telefónica). Other notable cables include the Medusa system, which connects twelve countries from Portugal to Egypt, and the FLAG Europe-Asia cable, which runs from the UK to Japan.
Colonel López Díaz warned of the bleak prospects for Ceuta if a submarine or surface diversion project is not established, even if solely financed by Spain. He mentioned the proposed tunnel across the Strait, which would connect Punta Paloma to the tip of Malabata near Tangier, a city that poses a significant competitive challenge to Spanish ports. He attributed great strategic value to Ceuta and Melilla concerning the Strait and Spain's control over traffic originating from or heading to these territories. He underscored the proximity of Melilla to Algeria, a traditional ally of Russia, as crucial for monitoring this route amidst a "new Cold War." He also speculated about the future possibility of a toll fee for crossing the Strait for the benefit of both cities.
According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), approximately 300 vessels navigate through the Strait daily, equating to one every 4.8 minutes, totaling 110,000 annually, including ferries, with over 10% of global maritime trade passing through. This includes 3.3 million barrels of oil per day and all maritime traffic between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, valued at $1.1 trillion (around 10 trillion dirhams). The commercial fleet alone accounts for 54,000 annual passages (148 daily, excluding ferries), composed of oil tankers (16,000, constituting 30% of commercial traffic), container ships (19,000, making up 35%), and routes connecting Algeciras, Ceuta, and Tangier (28,000). Colonel López Díaz described this region as "the most congested point with the highest density of vessels per kilometer on the planet," vital for the maritime commerce of approximately 512 million inhabitants across 22 Mediterranean countries.
Gibraltar shares a unique status as a maritime choke point devoid of alternative shipping routes, similar to the Turkish straits, unlike Malacca, Suez, or Panama, where diversions could take several additional days. The Colonel noted an inverse correlation between traffic through Gibraltar and interruptions in the Suez Canal, with recent attacks by Houthi forces in the Red Sea leading to a diversion of 60% to 70% of container traffic between Europe and Asia, resulting in reduced flows towards the east through Gibraltar by 15% to 20% while slightly increasing westward traffic through the Atlantic.
Colonel López Díaz also brought attention to the jurisdictional waters east of Gibraltar, describing them as a waiting zone for orders from The Rock. He criticized how Spanish territorial waters are reserved solely for departure, mooring, and the innocent passage of vessels, a practice well-known and reported by the Spanish Navy (Armada). He pointed out that since the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, British territory has expanded by 15% through land reclamation, with an increase in surface area from 5.8 to slightly over 6.7 square kilometers. He noted the puzzling aspect that most of the fill material comes from the Iberian Peninsula, without any objections from Spanish authorities.
Moreover, Colonel López Díaz highlighted concerns regarding the ownership of vessels, some of which are Russian and Chinese, their opaque insurance coverage, and the heightened risk of spills associated with the so-called Russian ghost fleet, which has been involved in ship-to-ship transfers off Ceuta since the invasion of Ukraine. He explained that Aframax tankers (approximately 700,000 barrels) wait there for very large crude carriers (VLCCs, 2 million barrels) to couple and transfer their cargo, a process that requires three operations to fill a VLCC, which then proceeds to Asia via the southern route around Africa. While it seems that Moscow currently respects international law, with its tankers operating beyond the twelve nautical mile limit and occasional incursions into territorial waters, most of these vessels are aging, and some have previously transported Iranian and Venezuelan crude, as per the author’s observations.
Ultimately, Colonel López Díaz lamented that Spain has treated each of these issues in isolation without interlinking them. He criticized successive governments for their divergent approaches based on political affiliations, emphasizing the lack of a cohesive state strategy regarding the Strait region. He noted that since 2000, drug trafficking has evolved from local cannabis smuggling to a highly violent transnational network focused on the massive importation of cocaine, and the region encompassing Morocco, Ceuta, and Melilla has required heightened attention since 2001 in matters of immigration, counter-terrorism cooperation, and combatting human trafficking networks.
As reported by barlamane.com.
