Europe has officially embarked on a new chapter in its migration policy, as heralded by Brussels. The new EU Migration Pact, which took effect on June 12, has been positioned as a transformative measure by EU Interior Commissioner Magnus Brunner, who claimed it would allow Europe to better regulate who may enter, stay, or be expelled. This, he asserted, would lead to enhanced control over migration flows.
However, the recent events in Ceuta tell a different story. In late July, over 70,000 individuals managed to breach the border between Morocco and the Spanish enclave, resulting in 82 fatalities on the Spanish side and at least 14 on the Moroccan side. This incident served as the first significant stress test for the new migration framework. Remarkably, Brunner’s evaluation on August 4 was highly optimistic, suggesting that the reforms were effective, irregular migration had sharply decreased, and Europe had “definitely passed” the test, given that no one had reached the Spanish mainland and the border was swiftly secured.
Yet, the reality on the ground presents a stark contrast to this optimistic assessment. Many young men continue to sleep in public parks, doorways, and forests, while the police have repeatedly dismantled makeshift camps on Trampolín beach, only to see them reappear the next evening. Women living in the area report feelings of insecurity, particularly in the outskirts. The political climate remains tumultuous as well, with disputes occurring over the fate of approximately 500 minors transported to the mainland and about accountability, both among political parties and between Ceuta and Madrid. Reports have even surfaced of illegal attempts to cross to the mainland with the help of human traffickers.
Ceuta: A Microcosm of Europe's Migration Crisis
The situation in Ceuta serves as a magnifying glass revealing the ongoing failures within Europe’s migration system. One of the primary issues begins before the border fence, as Europe has offloaded a significant portion of its border security responsibilities. While Turkey acts as the gatekeeper in the east, Morocco has become indispensable for Spain in the west, a relationship that is contingent on the cooperation of these nations.
For the period from 2021 to 2027, the EU has committed 500 million euros specifically for migration cooperation with Morocco, with 150 million earmarked as budgetary support. This funding is intended for border management, police collaboration, and combating human trafficking. However, Moroccan authorities spectacularly failed to uphold their end of the deal at the end of July, only to demonstrate their capability by halting nearly 300 migrants in mid-August. A senior diplomat revealed that more than 20,000 security personnel are stationed at the border daily, highlighting a critical flaw in Europe’s strategy: dependence on authoritarian neighbors for border security has granted these nations substantial influence over Europe’s borders.
Poland provides a contrasting example; despite facing a non-cooperative neighbor in Belarus, it has managed to largely contain the illegal migration actively promoted by Minsk. This demonstrates that effective border management can be achieved without reliance on unstable partnerships.
The Fragile Structure of Schengen and the Migration Paradox
Brunner's assertion that the Schengen Agreement remains intact is also questionable. A borderless internal zone can only function effectively if mutual trust exists among member states and the external borders are secure. The crisis in Ceuta has severely undermined this trust. Italy instituted border controls on August 1, specifically in response to the mass influx from Ceuta and the potential for migrants to traverse further into the Schengen area. Despite Brunner's claim on August 4 that Schengen was unaffected, Spain reciprocated with its own checks on Italy just four days later. This situation clearly indicates that Ceuta has triggered new border controls within the Schengen region.
Compounding these challenges is the blurring of lines between asylum, work migration, and irregular migration. Legally, the distinctions are clear; however, in practice, they often overlap. Individuals who enter irregularly can apply for asylum and remain in the country during the application process. If granted asylum, their status shifts from irregular to legal, accompanied by significant social entitlements. In 2025, 39% of first-instance asylum decisions across the EU were positive. Even those who are denied asylum or later lose their residency rights are not necessarily forced to leave, as deportations frequently fail. This creates a profound dilemma for Europe: once an individual crosses the border, they may transition from irregular entry to prolonged or even legal residency.
For a rule of law to function effectively, illegal actions must have consequences; otherwise, the strongest incentive becomes merely crossing the border, regardless of the legality of the stay.
Many Europeans currently focus on the negative aspects of migration: overwhelmed schools, security issues, rising social costs, and transforming neighborhoods, resulting in a hardened public sentiment. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that migration has not always been a challenge; it has historically been a success story. Millions of Europeans once arrived in America with little more than hope, establishing businesses and families that significantly contributed to the nation’s rise as a global power. Thus, one must question why migration is perceived as detrimental today. This paradox was already noted by economist Milton Friedman in 1977, who pointed to the largely unrestricted immigration to the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, which was viewed as a success. Today, however, many in the U.S. reject the idea of open immigration.
Friedman argued that the contradiction lies in the distinction between free immigration to jobs and free immigration to welfare states. The two cannot coexist effectively. In the former scenario, both sides benefit: the migrant finds employment, and the host country gains labor and production. The welfare state, however, alters incentives, as it ensures support for those unable to secure work, leading to significant distortions in the case of unrestricted migration.
People respond to incentives. This is especially critical in the context of migration. For instance, a study by the OECD highlighted that humanitarian migrants moving within Austria cited better job opportunities as a reason for relocating to Vienna; however, a substantial percentage also pointed to higher social benefits. This indicates that social assistance plays a significant role in decision-making, reflecting the reality that individuals, just like Austrians and businesses, respond to incentives.
Ultimately, the most pressing question is whether Europe can balance a robust welfare state with largely unrestricted migration. Europe must confront this dilemma head-on. Currently, the EU is attempting to do everything at once: maintaining strong welfare states, upholding Schengen without internal borders, and ensuring extensive protections, all while struggling with ineffective deportations and a reliance on external partners like Morocco and Turkey for border security. The ramifications of this multifaceted approach are evident today.
While the new EU Pact promises tangible changes, Ceuta underscores the persistent contradictions within Europe’s migration framework. Until deportations are successful, external borders remain dependent on goodwill from neighboring nations, and generous welfare states continue to attract migrants, Brunner’s claim of having “passed the test” appears premature.
As reported by exxpress.at.
