On September 14, 2026, Morocco’s mission to the European Union sent a targeted letter to several Spanish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This initiative came just before a debate scheduled for September 16 concerning the migration crisis in Ceuta, with a resolution vote planned for September 18. Described as a clarification effort, the letter appears to be more of a political damage control attempt. Rabat claims its intention is to "clarify the causes and actors" behind the massive influx of people on July 30 and 31. The Moroccan mission cites online misinformation and trafficking networks while reiterating its commitment to readmit those affected.
However, this circumstantial argument arises precisely as the European Parliament is set to examine the issue, indicating a desperate diplomatic offensive aimed at quelling criticism before it can escalate into a politically damaging European dimension for Morocco. By targeting several Spanish MEPs, particularly those from the more accommodating Socialist party, Rabat aims to influence the debate directly and limit support for the resolution.
Despite this strategic communication effort, it faces undeniable evidence that has emerged since the crisis. Declassified documents reveal that Spanish intelligence services had received multiple alerts prior to the mass arrivals, with the CNI (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) specifically noting preparations for a significant border crossing as early as July 29. Additionally, an investigation by the Audiencia Nacional adds further complications for Rabat, as it looks into the conditions surrounding the arrivals and the potential roles of various actors. Reports attributed to the CENIF (Centro Nacional de Inmigración y Fronteras) suggest "prior planning" and "active guidance" attributed to Moroccan agents, undermining the Moroccan narrative that the crisis was primarily driven by misinformation and trafficking networks.
The Moroccan argument regarding cooperation on returns comes only after the mass arrivals and mainly addresses the management of their consequences. It does not adequately respond to legitimate questions about the circumstances leading to the onset of the crisis. By emphasizing returns, Rabat attempts to shift the focus away from the potential roles of Moroccan actors to solely managing migration issues. Overall, the bilateral context sheds light on this premeditated and planned inundation of Ceuta, a fact that cannot be overlooked.
On July 20, Pedro Sánchez visited Algiers to revitalize Spanish-Algerian relations. Since then, Madrid and Algiers have entered a new phase of cooperation, marked by renewed political dialogue and the preparation of an eighth high-level meeting in Madrid set for October. For Rabat, this rapprochement represents a significant diplomatic setback. After painstakingly nurturing a privileged relationship with Madrid since 2022, Morocco now sees Algeria regaining its strategic importance in the Spanish equation. This shift diminishes Rabat's ability to present its relationship with Spain as exclusive or indispensable.
Another issue has exacerbated this tension. On September 10, the Spanish Congress approved a text allowing Sahrawis born under Spanish administration in Western Sahara, along with their direct descendants, to obtain Spanish nationality. This parliamentary initiative directly touches upon one of Morocco's most sensitive issues, reintroducing the historical status of Western Sahara and the legal connection between Spain and the Sahrawi people into the Spanish political debate. It starkly reminds all parties involved of a harsh reality that Rabat seeks to systematically obscure in its relations with Madrid: Western Sahara remains a non-self-governing territory, with its final status unresolved and Morocco's claimed sovereignty not recognized by the United Nations.
The letter sent on September 14 thus coincides with several pressing issues: the migration crisis, the European debate, the Spanish-Algerian rapprochement, and the Sahrawi question. The use of migratory pressure, for the second time following the May 2021 crisis, assumes a significance that transcends Ceuta. It serves as a warning to the current government, and particularly to the next Spanish administration (possibly right-leaning). Rabat seeks to remind Spain that it possesses a powerful lever capable of instigating a crisis with far-reaching national and European implications at any moment. The language of coercion is unmistakable: any Spanish government that deviates from Moroccan interests risks facing migratory pressure and a halt to security, judicial, and anti-terrorism cooperation, potentially destabilizing it and placing Brussels before a new multi-faceted crisis.
In conclusion, for Rabat, the Ceuta crisis has become as much about containing a situation temporarily as it is about demonstrating its significant capacity to disrupt affairs in Spain and Europe.
As reported by tsa-algerie.com.
