Spain's entry into NATO in 1982 was marked by a unique predicament that remains unresolved even after 44 years: two of its territories are located in Africa, and the treaty that outlines the collective defense obligations was drafted in 1949 with a primary focus on Europe and North America. Ceuta and Melilla do not clearly fall within the geographical perimeter defined by Article 5, while the Canary Islands are explicitly included due to a clause that protects islands situated north of the Tropic of Cancer. This discrepancy in territorial designation has significant implications for Spain's national security and NATO's collective defense commitments.
As NATO asserts its readiness to defend “every inch” of allied territory, a high-ranking official within the Alliance has indicated that a political response would be forthcoming in the event of aggression against these Spanish cities. However, the underlying anomaly persists: when faced with a crisis involving Morocco, a portion of Spain's deterrent strategy continues to hinge on how its allies interpret and choose to act in such scenarios. The roots of this situation trace back 33 years to Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 establishes that an armed attack against an ally in Europe or North America is considered an attack against all members, while Article 6 specifies the geographical scope, including allied territories in these regions, Turkey, and islands under the jurisdiction of member states located in the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Upon Spain's accession to the Alliance in 1982, Ceuta and Melilla remained on the African continent, and four decades later, the treaty's geographical delineation has not fundamentally changed. Interestingly, an armed attack against the Canary Islands fits within the territorial definition of Article 6 due to their location north of the Tropic of Cancer. In contrast, Ceuta and Melilla, despite being Spanish territory, lack the same clarity because they are part of continental Africa. This distinction does not imply that an aggression would go unanswered by NATO; however, it does create a crucial difference in terms of deterrence: a potential adversary may harbor more uncertainties regarding NATO's response to actions against Ceuta or Melilla than it would for an attack clearly encompassed by Articles 5 and 6.
The Madrid summit in 2022 sent a powerful political signal, with allies committing to defend “every inch of allied territory” and adopting a comprehensive 360-degree defense strategy against threats from any direction. This new Strategic Concept reinforced the message that no member should feel unprotected, although it did not alter Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Thus, a peculiar situation arises: the current political stance of the Alliance is far more expansive and assertive than the geographical limitations established in 1949.
It is essential to clarify that this does not mean that NATO would categorically refuse assistance to Spain. The Alliance has indicated that activating Article 5 requires a political decision from the allies. Javier Colomina, a prominent Spanish figure within NATO, has maintained that the Alliance would respond politically should Spain invoke it regarding incidents in Ceuta or Melilla. Moreover, Spain can also utilize Article 4, which allows for consultations when a member perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. Consequently, the issue is not a prohibition on aiding Spain; rather, it lies in the ambiguity surrounding the response, which lacks the same clarity as provided by the treaty in other territories.
The complexity deepens with the emergence of hybrid threats. NATO's strategy already addresses these types of actions, and Colomina has pointed out that a hybrid campaign may reach the threshold of Article 5, although determining precisely when this occurs can be challenging. Border crises, destabilization operations, or the manipulation of migration flows create precisely this dilemma: before deciding how to respond, it is imperative to assess what is happening, who is instigating it, and whether it constitutes a genuine armed attack or a sufficiently severe hybrid campaign. This ambiguity can itself represent a vulnerability.
Furthermore, the European Union has its own mutual defense clause. Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty stipulates that if a member state suffers an armed aggression on its territory, the others are obliged to provide “help and assistance by all means in their power.” Here, there is no equivalent delineation that excludes Spanish territories in North Africa. However, this does not imply that there exists an automatic European army ready to deploy; each state retains its capabilities and decisions on how to materialize that assistance, and for NATO members, the European treaty acknowledges the Alliance as the foundation of their collective defense.
Ultimately, the true gap lies in uncertainty. Spain contributes to the collective defense of its allies with troops, aircraft, and naval vessels, from the Baltic Sea to various maritime missions of the Alliance, while two of its strategically sensitive territories remain subject to a peculiarity inherited from a treaty drafted long before Spain's membership in the organization. It is untenable to assert that NATO would “never” defend Ceuta and Melilla; current political commitments indicate otherwise. Nevertheless, the legal anomaly persists, and this difference is crucial in terms of deterrence. The best guarantee is not merely that allies will probably respond in a crisis, but that potential aggressors are fully aware that they will be met with a robust response, thereby preventing any provocation from occurring in the first place.
As reported by xataka.com.
