Government's Denial of Police Findings
The Spanish government has opted to tackle the police report regarding the Ceuta incident with the same approach it has employed since the crisis unfolded on July 30: denying evidence, twisting words, and diverting responsibility away from Morocco. Initially, the blame was placed on criminal organizations, followed by the National Intelligence Center (CNI), and later on Russia, Israel, and the so-called "far-right international." Now, the focus has shifted to the National Police itself.
Francisco Pardo, the Director General of the Police, informed the Interior Minister that "there is no police report" attributing the planning or execution of the events on July 30 and 31 to Moroccan security forces. This is the official response the government seeks to use to dismiss the 55-page document submitted to Judge María Tardón by the National Center for Immigration and Borders, which is part of the General Commission for Immigration and Borders.
However, the existence of the document cannot be denied. While it does not yet identify the mastermind behind the operation or formally attribute the order to organize it to the Moroccan government, the caution exercised here is necessary to avoid turning a police analysis into a judicial conclusion that has yet to be reached. Yet, using this lack of individualized authorship to deny the evidence presented in the report constitutes a semantic manipulation that is difficult to accept.
The police report does not merely describe a passive attitude from Morocco; it documents the active involvement of uniformed members of Moroccan security forces, including them among the organizers on the ground and concluding that there was a planned, monitored, and phased execution of actions. The report asserts that Moroccan agents "in some cases, participated by guiding crossings through the water" and directed immigrants toward El Tarajal beach. It elaborates that uniformed personnel were providing instructions for entering Spain, managing the flow of people towards predetermined areas, and coordinating the arrival of large vehicles filled with immigrants.
Additionally, the police identified non-uniformed individuals acting "as managers of the process," monitoring, propelling, and directing the crowd. Some of these individuals were even reported to be "giving instructions to the Moroccan security forces." Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to uphold the claim that the report does not attribute any involvement to Moroccan agents in the execution of these operations. The document explicitly places them at level 3 of the organizational structure, corresponding to the "organizers of the flow of people on the ground." When analyzing the leadership level, it indicates that it was a "planned and executed process through the coordination of actors" from the previous levels. While the report does not indicate who issued the superior order, it does confirm who materially collaborated on the ground. Deliberately conflating these two issues allows the government to save a phrase, but it does not salvage its narrative. In fact, the contradiction with the claims made over weeks by Fernando Grande-Marlaska is absolute.
Contradictions and Overarching Issues
On the very day of the incident, as thousands overflowed the border, the Interior Ministry claimed that "human trafficking networks are exploiting a judicial ruling to promote the flow of undocumented migrants." In that statement, they also praised the "exemplary cooperation" between Spain and Morocco in migration matters. This statement remains published on the Ministry of the Interior's website, yet both assertions have been debunked by the police report itself.
The report categorically states that criminal organizations involved in human trafficking "lack the capacity to organize a movement of this magnitude." It further adds that "there is no indication" that would allow the identification of these organizations as promoters of the assault, not even in the social media campaigns, and dismisses their involvement in the planning and simultaneous management of the events. To gauge the disproportion, the police remind us that criminal organizations transported 20,924 immigrants from Morocco to Spain between January 1, 2024, and August 25, 2026. Even in their peak years of activity, they did not have the capacity to mobilize between 75,000 and 85,000 people immediately. Their subsequent involvement was limited, according to the report, to an "opportunistic exploitation" to clandestinely transport some of the immigrants who remained in Ceuta to the Peninsula. Therefore, Marlaska accused those whom the police have ruled out and praised the cooperation of those whom his own agents have identified as guiding access to Spain.
The alleged "exemplary cooperation" is further discredited by another paragraph in the document. The Moroccan police response during July 30 and 31 was, according to CENIF, "at the very least, one of total permissiveness." There was "no serious attempt" to reduce, disperse, or push the crowd away from the border perimeter, despite the concentration of security forces in the area due to the observance of Throne Day, which provided sufficient resources for a much more forceful action.
The contrast with what happened two weeks later is revealing. When a second mass entry was called for August 15, Morocco activated a "total control" device, intercepting movements and deactivating the attempt. The same security apparatus that remained virtually inactive for over 48 hours later demonstrated that it had the means to close the passage.
The report even suggests that this second call, much more visible and easier to detect, might have served as an exercise to "whitewash" the previous response. This is not a Spanish police force praising Moroccan cooperation; rather, it is a police body analyzing whether the subsequent reaction might have been intended to conceal the preceding permissiveness.
The second major falsehood propagated by the government involves denying the existence of warnings. Marlaska stated on August 4 that "there was no report or warning" from the CNI that could have anticipated something like this. He reiterated on August 25 that there was no report that could have "foreseen" an unprecedented entry and added that if anyone had that information, they would have escalated it to higher authorities to adopt measures. He publicly declared this after the Council of Ministers. Ángel Víctor Torres reinforced that narrative: "If we had known that there would be an arrival of tens of thousands of people, our response would have been different." The trick lies in hiding behind the acronyms of the CNI to avoid acknowledging what the police were aware of.
The report reveals that on July 27, the Provincial Brigade of Immigration and Borders in Ceuta sent a form to the National Communications Center, which was titled "Mass Entry of Immigrants by Swimming." Two days later, on July 29, CENIF issued a "Mass Entry Risk Alert" directed to the border posts in Ceuta and Melilla regarding the anticipated risk of irregular entries on July 30. The warning included names, locations, and dates. While it is true that an alert did not necessarily indicate that tens of thousands of individuals would enter, it also does not prove that Marlaska personally received the document. What it does make impossible is the assertion that the Spanish state lacked prior information about the risk of a mass entry. An agency under the police detected the danger, issued the alert, and distributed it within the border system. The pertinent question is no longer whether the CNI used exactly those words, but rather what happened to the police warning, who received it, why it did not escalate—if it did not escalate—through the chain of command, and why the border was not reinforced. The report itself includes these alerts in a section titled "Other subjects with possible responsibilities" and indicates that the effects of actions taken in Morocco could be "amplified or mitigated" through an appropriate response within Spanish territory.
The third lie concerns the nature of the crisis. The government has portrayed the events as a migration avalanche fueled by inequality, a Supreme Court ruling, criminal organizations, and rumors spread on social media. Pedro Sánchez even pointed to networks linked to Russia, Israel, and a "far-right international," while publicly exonerating Morocco and asserting that without its cooperation, the situation would have been even worse. Sánchez maintained this version on August 31. However, the police report outlines a very different scenario. "This is not something incidental that can be associated with an occasional or spontaneous factor," it concludes. The operation repeated patterns observed in 2021 and 2024 but incorporated accumulated experience that made it "a much more complex and elaborate action." It also does not consider that the primary aim was migratory. Immigration operated "only as a formal cover" to encourage, promote, and direct a massive flow towards the border. The police arrive at this conclusion because approximately 90% of those who entered voluntarily returned to Morocco. The dynamics of return allow for a "unequivocal" determination that, for the vast majority, the ultimate goal was not to remain in Spain. According to the police, what transpired was designed with other objectives in mind. The report refers to a "strategic and operational direction" that acted according to "perfectly defined procedures" throughout various phases. It points to a previous "intellectual authorship" and a simultaneous "material authorship," although it still cannot individualize its members. It describes an operation with a "very high" level of technicality and planning, involving various coordinated structures around "a shared objective" and "a single organizational reference." It also reconstructs the tactics. The first phase aimed to "collapse the border management system" by forcing Spain to divert resources toward rescuing individuals in the water while simultaneously saturating the reception space. Once the gates were opened, a second phase aimed to "eliminate Spain's capacity for response," progressively incorporating women, children, and families to complicate any police reaction. This was not a disordered multitude arriving at the border. The police emphasize that tens of thousands were able to move to the same point without roadblocks, without transportation collapses, and without significant incidents of public order in Morocco. Such logistical precision is "incompatible" with spontaneous mobilization and internal disorganization. The fourth falsehood concerns the figures. Marlaska claimed that 72,000 people had entered and that 70,000 had already returned to Morocco. He even presented the situation as "controlled" and "reverted" in just 24 hours. These were the figures provided by the minister on August 4. However, CENIF states that as of August 26, there were no reliable data on how many had entered, how many had exited, or how many remained in Ceuta. It speaks of the "impossibility of quantification" due to the massive and uncontrolled nature of the accesses and the coinciding, on the 31st, of simultaneous flows of entry and return. The report cites contradictory official figures: 49,200 entries according to a Civil Guard report, 78,000 according to the president of Ceuta, 72,000 according to Marlaska, an estimated 20,000 individuals captured in an image, and a global calculation of between 75,000 and 85,000. Regarding returns, there are equally incompatible figures. The minister transformed an estimate into a certainty and used it to convey an image of control that did not exist. The police admit something much more alarming: the lack of data even prevents the "dimensioning of the threat" and complicates planning for any short, medium, and long-term response. Neither did they know how many had entered, nor do they know precisely how many remain in Spain. Yet the government circulated fixed figures as if it had accounted for a border operation that remained out of control for hours.
In conclusion, the report's political ramifications are devastating. The entry caused "a collapse of the response capabilities of the Spanish border control system" and "a massive violation of Spain's territorial sovereignty." It resulted in institutional saturation, deterioration of public safety, sociopolitical agitation, distrust in institutions, damage to international image, and an "evident internal political destabilization." Moreover, there is one last warning that becomes particularly significant following the confrontation instigated by the government against the CNI and the attempts to hold Margarita Robles accountable. The report indicates that questioning the intelligence service could constitute a "textbook offensive counterintelligence action." The police are warning that the operation did not end when the influx of individuals ceased. The subsequent phase includes disinformation, division within Spanish institutions, erosion of the CNI, and internal conflict within the government—precisely what has transpired.
The executive may cling to the fact that the report has not yet identified the intellectual author, but it cannot erase everything else. There was prior planning. There were alerts. The mafias lacked the capacity to organize it. Moroccan agents guided the crossings. There were coordinators on the ground. The border was deliberately collapsed. The migratory purpose functioned as a cover. The official figures were unreliable. And Spanish sovereignty suffered a massive violation. Marlaska must now explain not only why the border fell but also why he denied the warnings that existed, accused mafias that his police have ruled out, praised Moroccan forces that his own agents identified as guiding access, and presented certain figures that no one could accurately know. Furthermore, Pedro Sánchez must clarify why, in light of a report that describes a highly specialized operation executed from Moroccan territory involving the intervention of agents.
As reported by larazon.es.
