Spanish Interior Minister Addresses Migration Crisis in Ceuta: No Blame on Morocco

Spain's Response to the Migration Surge

On Friday, Spanish Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska addressed Spanish lawmakers, asserting that Moroccan authorities were not responsible for the irregular migration flows that inundated the city of Ceuta. He emphasized that both Rabat and Spanish intelligence and security agencies were unable to foresee the magnitude of this operation, which resulted in roughly 72,000 individuals entering the city, marking one of the most significant crises Madrid has faced this year. The minister attributed the crisis to "multiple factors," firmly rejecting any blame on Morocco or Spanish intelligence services for the events that transpired. He clarified that the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the Armed Forces’ intelligence agency (CIFAS), and other law enforcement agencies did not possess the information necessary to anticipate such a large-scale incursion.

During a session of the Interior Committee in the Spanish Parliament, Minister Grande-Marlaska responded to demands from several political groups that pointed fingers at Morocco, seeking clarifications regarding warnings that preceded the crisis. He stated that "state intelligence agencies are always working," and noted that he never assigned blame to any intelligence body, including the CNI, CIFAS, or the national police and civil guard. He detailed that while there were concerns regarding potential attempts at irregular migration, these apprehensions were consistent with previous years. Reports available prior to July 30 primarily discussed migration-related factors, such as economic disparities that serve as incentives for irregular migration, along with the activities of smuggling networks.

Cooperation with Morocco and Security Measures

Minister Grande-Marlaska elaborated that some reports also included warnings related to a ruling from the Spanish Supreme Court, which prohibited the expulsion of individuals arriving by sea. This legal development prompted the Interior Ministry to implement precautionary measures; however, the data did not provide specific indicators that would allow for predictions of a mass entry of the scale witnessed in Ceuta. He firmly stated that the assumption that authorities were aware of what would occur on July 30 was "not true," reiterating that the warnings received by the Interior Ministry were similar to those received in past years regarding attempts to swim into Ceuta, lacking any extraordinary indicators that would suggest the arrival of tens of thousands of individuals.

He remarked that had the security and intelligence agencies had accurate information regarding an operation of this size, they would have heightened their state of alert and taken different measures, recalling the experience of the Ceuta crisis in 2021, where available data led to the implementation of exceptional security measures. While denying any Moroccan responsibility for the crisis, Grande-Marlaska reaffirmed the significant role Rabat has played over the years in managing irregular migration, describing Morocco's cooperation in this regard as "essential" and built on "trust." He noted that Moroccan authorities continued to fulfill this role even during July, prior to the outbreak of the crisis on July 30.

The minister provided figures indicating the scale of Moroccan interventions prior to the crisis, stating that Moroccan authorities had, until July 30, managed to prevent 1,026 attempts to swim into Ceuta and executed 2,857 interception operations. He pointed out that these numbers were lower than those recorded in 2024, when over a thousand people attempted to enter by sea in a single day. Grande-Marlaska insisted that these statistics demonstrate the extensive interception and containment operations conducted by Moroccan authorities, rejecting any attempts to connect these figures to the entry of tens of thousands into Ceuta on July 30, asserting that "Moroccan interception operations are significantly higher," and that the leap from previous data to conclude the possibility of 72,000 individuals arriving "cannot be made," highlighting that the majority of those who entered that day did so via the maritime barrier rather than by swimming.

Simultaneously, the Spanish Interior Ministry confirmed that it had reinforced security measures in Ceuta and Melilla during July and early August to address the risks associated with irregular migration. Grande-Marlaska stated that the Civil Guard had increased its presence in July by 70 additional personnel, with over 1,600 officers deployed on the ground. On July 8, the Civil Guard had seven operational marine units, each comprising 30 personnel, while the national police bolstered its presence with an additional 300 officers, including specialists in border control and immigration matters, and the Civil Guard added 250 personnel to its resources.

Authorities also revealed that on July 9, they began implementing new systems aimed at facilitating expulsion processes at the borders, along with the installation of a line of buoys and an aerial barrier, separated by a 50-meter wide maritime corridor, which became fully operational on August 1. While acknowledging the possibility of errors in crisis management, Grande-Marlaska rejected attributing any blame to Morocco or Spanish intelligence agencies, asserting that he "acknowledges all errors that may have been committed" by his ministry and that he is not appearing before Parliament to justify himself but rather to present the facts.

Additionally, the Spanish Interior Minister denied reports suggesting the absence of senior security officials, generals, and commissioners responsible for security and immigration matters in Ceuta during the crisis, confirming that the relevant officials were present and monitoring the situation. In an effort to mitigate the repercussions of the crisis on the security forces involved, Grande-Marlaska announced that he is working on establishing an "extraordinary grant" for state forces and agencies operating in Ceuta, emphasizing that this measure is not new and has been previously adopted during other occasions, including in response to the flooding disaster "Dana" that struck Valencia in 2024.