Following the significant influx of migrants into Ceuta at the end of July, speculation arose among Spanish and Moroccan media regarding a potential involvement of Algeria. The allegations were partly supported by the emergence of phone numbers with an Algerian country code, which allegedly appeared in groups mobilizing migrants. However, the official report from the Spanish National Center for Immigration and Borders (CENIF) does not substantiate these claims.
The theory of an 'Algerian hand' primarily stems from a private study conducted by Spanish security analyst José María Gil Garre, who examined activities on social media platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, X, and WhatsApp. Media outlets, including the Spanish newspaper La Razón and the Moroccan government-aligned portal Le360, highlighted his findings. Notably, a phone number with the Algerian country code +213 was even portrayed as a digital command center for the operation.
Police Do Not Endorse Algeria Theory
In the CENIF report, Algeria's supposed involvement is explicitly addressed in the context of political and media counter-narratives that emerged after the crisis. The investigators do not endorse the theory of Algerian interference.
Data further undermines the notion of Algeria playing a significant role: a staggering 90.8% of the phone numbers within the examined mobilization groups had a Moroccan country code, while only 9.2% were foreign numbers. Algerian numbers comprised merely about 2.7% of the entire sample.
Other phone numbers were traced back to countries including Egypt, Spain, Yemen, France, Germany, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Canada. According to the investigators, the presence of a foreign country code alone does not imply the involvement of a state or an operation orchestrated from that country.
Unknown Organizers and Moroccan Anomalies
Additionally, CENIF concludes that the mass entry into Ceuta was not entirely spontaneous. The mobilization was reportedly organized in phases and coordinated on-site through social networks.
However, the investigators could not identify who was behind the strategic planning. The Spanish Ministry of the Interior stated there is insufficient evidence to prove the involvement of “a government, a service, an agency, or an individual.” Consequently, the actual leadership behind the operation remains unknown.
On the Moroccan side of the border, the report offers specific insights regarding the situation. CENIF emphasizes the unusually low presence of Moroccan security forces around Fnideq on July 30. According to statements from migrants and the analysis of publicly accessible videos, uniformed personnel appeared to direct individuals toward the water, while plainclothes men seemingly monitored or coordinated movements. The report refers to this as an “active steering” of the crowd.
Of particular note to investigators is the comparison with events on August 15, when social media again mobilized individuals to cross the border; Moroccan authorities deployed a substantial security presence and successfully prevented access to the border.
According to CENIF, this indicates that Morocco possesses the resources to thwart such mass movements when necessary.
As reported by africa-live.de.
