The recent surge of violent incidents in Ceuta, including neighborhood sweeps, boycotts, container burnings, damage to makeshift settlements, and extortion of humanitarian workers, has sparked significant unrest. Ester Muñoz, spokesperson for the Popular Party (PP) in Congress, emphasized the urgent need to "restore order" in light of the government's inaction. Just days ago, the PP, led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo, branded migrants as invaders and criminals, invoking chaos and public health threats. They called for the immediate deportation of all individuals who entered Ceuta illegally and stigmatized unaccompanied minors to prevent them from receiving the legally required assessment for international protection. This rhetoric, reminiscent of Vox's earlier calls for a "migrant hunt," highlighted a common narrative among right-wing parties that has been both dangerous and detrimental.
The coalition between the PP and Vox has shown clear symptoms in the autonomous communities they govern, reminiscent of the immigration policies from José María Aznar's and Mariano Rajoy's administrations. Historical precedents include the repatriation of Sub-Saharan migrants under sedation in 1996 and the tragic events of 2014, where 15 individuals were killed during a border incident. These rapid-response methods, coupled with the controversial practice of 'hot returns,' were alarmingly effective in deterring migrants en masse.
In their approach to Morocco, right-wing factions have advocated for the indefinite closure of borders, the permanent militarization of Ceuta and Melilla, economic sanctions, and the suspension of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement. These demands appear to ignore the realities of international cooperation and the necessity of Brussels' support. The implications of mass deportations promoted by these parties raise concerns, particularly if Morocco were to refuse to accept any returnees. Moreover, Morocco plays a crucial role in managing migration flows, combating drug trafficking, and countering jihadist terrorism. The right-wing's focus seems less about viable solutions and more about inciting hatred and undermining governmental credibility, risking a descent into chaos reminiscent of past political upheavals.
Continuing down this path would not only jeopardize Spain's global standing but also place the nation in a position of heightened vulnerability. As a member of the EU facing significant migration pressure, Spain is entitled to seek assistance from the Annual Solidarity Fund under the Migration and Asylum Pact, as well as from European agencies like Frontex and third-party countries within the Union. However, failure to operate within the legal framework established by EU law—encompassing asylum, reception, border control, returns, the protection of fundamental rights, and special care for unaccompanied minors—could lead to the denial of essential resources and the initiation of infringement procedures. Previously, Ceuta received over €23 million to manage migrant reception, identification, and assistance, but the proposals by the PP-Vox coalition could threaten this critical support, including the €32 million requested by the government.
Moreover, Europe is unlikely to risk its relationship with Morocco by imposing illegal methods to protect national identities and symbols. Ceuta and Melilla represent Europe's only physical borders with Africa and are vital for maintaining stability in the Maghreb, Sahel, and the Strait of Gibraltar. Morocco is acutely aware of its strategic importance and leverages this knowledge effectively. It is particularly surprising that Spanish right-wing parties have mirrored this approach. Spain's geopolitical role is critical, overseeing sensitive borders; engaging in reckless electoral politics in this arena is both perilous and unbecoming of a coalition aspiring to govern the nation.
Consequently, it is rational that the Government has undertaken complex diplomatic maneuvers, continuously emphasizing Morocco's supposed collaboration, despite the prevailing notion that many of these issues might not have arisen had the Moroccan authorities chosen to intervene. It is common knowledge that Morocco has its own strategic agenda and has never concealed its territorial ambitions—Ceuta, Melilla, and various enclaves remain intertwined with its narrative of territorial integrity. Furthermore, Morocco seeks to enhance its presence in the Strait, which sees 100,000 vessels annually, accounting for 10% of global maritime traffic. The Tangier Med port is envisioned as a hub for transshipment, imports, exports, and industry, strategically connected to trade routes across the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and beyond, positioning itself to compete with the Port of Algeciras. Morocco's Port Strategy 2030 aims to modernize its ports, expand commercial networks, and control the traffic of fuel and liquefied gas, thereby ensuring its economic, logistical, security, and political advantage over Europe. The Gibraltar Agreement could potentially disrupt these plans, increasing Spanish presence and functions at international access points while reinforcing mutual dependency. Economically, northern Morocco relies more on Spain, while Spain depends on Rabat for stability in the Strait.
In summary, after adopting incendiary and overly aggressive stances, the Popular Party has opted to de-escalate and call for calm. Feijóo is now compelled to carefully navigate relations with Morocco, a nation backed by the United States and allied with Israel. He has already indicated that if he assumes the presidency in 2027, his first foreign trip will be to Morocco, maintaining a degree of ambiguity regarding Spain's position on the Sahara. After casting stones, it is indeed time to hide the hand.
As reported by publico.es.
