As discussions continue regarding Morocco's role in the recent massive influx of immigrants into Ceuta on July 30, the events have provided an opportunity for the Moroccan government and public opinion to assert their claims over the Spanish city, as well as Melilla. This situation also highlights the despair of countless Moroccan youths who, facing a bleak future, are willing to risk their lives in pursuit of a better life in Europe. Nationalism plays a significant role in sustaining a regime that is threatened by the possibility of social unrest.
For historians, the enduring nature of the Moroccan regime across centuries is indeed striking, especially since the ascension of the Alaouite monarchy in 1660. This is not just any monarchy; one of its key attributes is that its kings present themselves as sharifs, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Morocco historically functioned as a sultanate that possessed both religious and political legitimacy, a status that remained unchanged when Mohammed V became the first king of independent Morocco in 1957, following the end of French and Spanish colonial rule. The monarch continued to hold the title of Amir al-Mu’minin, or "Commander of the Faithful," which has proven to be significantly more influential than the six Moroccan constitutions enacted since 1962.
From Protectorate to Independence
Following the international conference in Algeciras in 1906, Morocco was only able to maintain a formal independence as a sultanate, as it became a Franco-Spanish protectorate in 1912, with foreign powers controlling its foreign policy, finances, military, and administration. Spain faced fierce resistance in the Rif region, where local tribes led by Abd el-Krim rejected both Spanish and sultan authority in their quest for an independent republic. This resistance sparked a brutal war from 1921 to 1926 that also involved the French authorities. Ultimately, both Spain and France quelled the rebellion.
Following this period, Sultan Mohammed V (1927-1961) emerged as a symbol of Moroccan nationalism, which led France to dethrone him in favor of his cousin Mohammed ben Arafa in 1953. However, widespread popular resistance forced the French to bring Mohammed V back from exile in Madagascar in 1955. At that time, France was significantly weakened by the war in Indochina and was grappling with an even more severe conflict in Algeria since 1954. This situation hastened the end of the protectorate, culminating in the recognition of Morocco's independence by France and Spain in 1956.
The Great Morocco and the Alaouite Monarchy
One of the key factors contributing to the longevity of the Alaouite monarchy lies in its alignment with nationalism through the doctrine of Greater Morocco. This doctrine was initially articulated by the Istiqlal party, which emerged before independence, and its leader, Allal el Fahsi (1910-1974). It is based on the idea of reconstructing historical Morocco, asserting that France and Spain, as colonial powers, had dismembered the territories that fell under the sultan's authority. Consequently, mere independence from the protectorate was insufficient; reclaiming neighboring territories that were not part of independent Morocco became imperative. Initially, the Istiqlal’s claims extended to Mauritania—recognized by Morocco only in 1969—western Algeria, and northern Mali. However, since the reign of Mohammed V, Moroccan claims have focused primarily on territories under Spanish sovereignty.
The Western Sahara is the most significant territory in the Greater Morocco project due to its strategic location and natural resources. In 1957, Morocco claimed the coastal enclaves of Cabo Juby and Ifni, viewing them as part of the southern protectorate. Moroccans never accepted the Spanish arguments that these territories were not part of the protectorate or were incorporated through agreements with tribes that did not recognize the sultan's authority. This dispute led to a brief armed conflict between the Moroccan National Liberation Army, which purportedly acted independently of Moroccan authorities, and Spanish forces. Ultimately, Spain ceded sovereignty over Cabo Juby, now known as Tarfaya, in 1958 and committed to transferring Ifni by 1969.
In the context of the Greater Morocco doctrine, the Western Sahara remains crucial due to its geopolitical significance and resources. Following the Green March of 1975, which facilitated the division of the territory between Morocco and Mauritania under the Madrid Agreement of the same year, a conflict ensued between Morocco and the Polisario Front that lasted until 1991 when the situation stabilized following Morocco's construction of a security wall exceeding 2,700 kilometers. Since 2007, Morocco has maintained a proposal for limited autonomy for this territory, albeit under Moroccan sovereignty.
The final components to complete the vision of Greater Morocco include the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as the nearby rocks and islets. Although these claims have never been brought before the UN Decolonization Committee, Moroccans continue to assert them, varying in intensity, in their relations with Spain. Arguments that these territories were never part of the Moroccan kingdom or that the principle of self-determination of the population—an essential aspect of contemporary international law—does not sway Moroccan perspectives. Their view is predominantly shaped by geography, coupled with a historical narrative in which the monarchy embodies supreme religious authority and territorial unity.
In summary, the persistence of the Alaouite monarchy and its political system cannot be reduced merely to constitutional frameworks; it is essential to consider the concept of "majzén," which translates to "store" or "treasure" and refers to the apparatus of power that historically revolved around the sultan and now, the king. This term encompasses the political, administrative, economic, and religious machinery of the Moroccan central power, articulated around the monarchy and incorporating the institutions and networks that facilitate the exercise of authority.
Despite the complexities of Moroccan politics, the regime cannot be classified as an absolute monarchy akin to other Arab monarchies. The first Moroccan constitution, promulgated in 1962 by King Hassan II, was approved in a referendum with an 84% turnout and 97% approval, but this did not transform him into a parliamentary monarch in the European sense. He retained the power to appoint the prime minister and ministers, preside over the council of ministers, and dissolve parliament while also being recognized as the Commander of the Faithful, the supreme religious authority due to his lineage from the Prophet. Following social and political protests in 1965, Hassan II declared a state of emergency, which lasted until 1970, consolidating both executive and legislative powers.
The 1970 constitution further reinforced royal power while limiting parliamentary authority, which was reduced to a single chamber. A subsequent constitution in 1972 restored some legislative powers to parliament, with two-thirds of its members elected by universal suffrage. It was not until 1992 that a more progressive constitution was enacted, granting additional powers to the prime minister and parliament while establishing a Constitutional Council and recognizing regions as territorial units. The 1996 constitution reinstated a bicameral legislature, comprising a Chamber of Representatives and a Chamber of Councillors, with the former elected directly every five years while the latter is indirectly elected by representatives of local, business, and professional organizations.
In contrast to the uprisings during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, Morocco did not witness a toppling of its head of state; instead, King Mohammed VI made concessions to prevent the spread of protests. The 2011 constitution, which remains in effect today, was introduced following large demonstrations that began on February 20, 2011. The king swiftly proposed a new constitutional text that expanded parliamentary powers, increased rights and freedoms, and elevated the Amazigh (Berber) language to an official status alongside Arabic. Although the constitutional framework designates the monarchy as "constitutional, democratic, and parliamentary," the reality is that while Morocco has a constitution, the core of power remains with the monarchy rather than being vested in an elected government.
The constitution stipulates that the monarch must appoint a prime minister from the party with the most seats in parliament. However, as no party is likely to achieve an absolute majority of the 198 seats out of a total of 395, coalition-building becomes essential. In cases of disagreement among parties, the monarch can appoint another candidate from the winning party to continue negotiations. This occurred after the 2016 elections, where the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) won, but its leader, Abdelilah Benkirán, could not broker an agreement, leading to Saadeddine El Othmani, also from the PJD, being appointed by the king in 2017 to form a government.
In the 2021 elections, the PJD suffered a complete collapse, dropping from 125 seats to just 13. The party with the most seats was the National Rally of Independents (RNI), which obtained 102, followed by the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) with 87, and the nationalist Istiqlal with 81. These three parties formed a government with RNI leader Aziz Ajanuch, a prominent businessman with a history of ministerial roles. The RNI can be characterized as liberal-conservative, advocating for free enterprise, while the PAM has a centrist orientation with a stronger social focus. Both parties maintain close ties to the monarchy.
Currently, Ajanuch's image has suffered due to associations with corruption allegations, which could impact the RNI's prospects in the upcoming 2026 elections scheduled for September 23. This time, it appears that the RNI and PAM will vie for the top spot, though Istiqlal will remain crucial in the political landscape. The Moroccan political system is characterized by pacts, which can be seen as a positive aspect; however, the downside is that coalition governments tend to dilute accountability and lead to contradictions. This can contribute to voter abstention, as citizens may conclude that voting for one party over another in a coalition is inconsequential. The 2026 elections will see competition between the PAM and RNI, but both have been part of the government. The RNI, with its prime minister, can claim any successes, but the PAM must highlight that not all objectives have been met, asserting that this will only be possible if they secure the most votes.
In some cases, contradictions have been pronounced. A notable example is the 2016 PJD government, which was in coalition with the RNI. The Islamists sought to implement social protection measures, but the RNI advocated for liberalization measures, such as withdrawing subsidies on fuels. The latter prevailed, leading to the disastrous electoral result for the PJD in 2021.
Despite these dynamics, the primary issue facing Moroccan elections remains voter apathy. In none of the last three elections did voter participation exceed 55% of registered voters, with particularly notable abstention rates among young people aged 18 to 24. Participation was recorded at 42.29% in 2016 and 50.18% in 2021, the latter coinciding with regional and local elections, which will not occur in the 2026 elections. Young people's disinterest can be attributed to their lack of faith in political parties to provide solutions, a sentiment widespread among a digital generation that primarily expresses itself through social media. Additionally, the Gen.Z.212 protest movement, which emerged in the fall of 2025, was met with harsh repression as it protested against institutional corruption and demanded reforms in services.
As reported by aceprensa.com.
