On September 13, 2026, we reflect on the complex historical relationship between Spain and Morocco, particularly concerning the territories of Ceuta and Melilla. In 1767, the crowns of Spain and Morocco signed the Treaty of Peace and Commerce, marking a significant shift after decades marked by hostility. This treaty was notable not only for being the first formal bilateral agreement but also for explicitly recognizing Spanish sovereignty over the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, alongside the smaller territories of Vélez de la Gomera and Alhucemas. The decades preceding this treaty were characterized by intermittent military confrontations and fragile truces, a pattern that continued until 1780 when a new treaty was required to resolve the crisis initiated by Sultan Mohammed III's siege of Melilla in 1774.
Fast forward to the present, and the current Moroccan monarch, King Mohammed VI, a direct descendant of Sultan Mohammed III, along with his government, is challenging the Spanish claims to these cities, which they regard as colonial possessions demanding restitution. This position aligns with the ideology of a 'Greater Morocco,' an irredentist claim that has gained traction within Morocco's political elite since the country gained independence in 1956. This ideology views the Maghreb region—including parts of Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, and Western Sahara—as the natural territorial domain of the Moroccan state, drawing on a supposed political and institutional continuity from historical dynasties such as the Almoravids, Almohads, and Merinids, leading to the current Alaouite dynasty.
The Myth of Territorial Continuity in Maghreb Empires
Morocco's self-definition is rooted not in its modern statehood established in 1956 but in an origin that traces back to 789 AD, with the Idrisid dynasty, which established the city of Fez. Moroccan historiography often highlights this moment as the foundation of Islamic rule in the western Maghreb, claiming a direct lineage from the founder Idris I to the Prophet Muhammad. However, this historical entity had no direct political or succession ties to later dynasties, particularly the current Alaouite dynasty. The Idrisids fragmented in the 10th century, succumbing to conflicts between the Fatimid and Umayyad caliphates. It was not until the 11th century that the Almoravids, a confederation of Berber warrior-monks from the Sahara, managed to unify the region once more, extending their influence across vast territories, including parts of the Iberian Peninsula, before their empire collapsed in the mid-12th century.
Both Ceuta and Melilla were historically integrated into these expansive dynasties, initially under the Caliphate of Córdoba in the 10th century, followed by the Almoravid and Almohad empires in the 11th to 13th centuries, and later under the Merinid Sultanate established in 1212. However, during the Merinids' decline, both cities fell into European hands—Ceuta was captured by Portugal in 1415, and Melilla was taken by the Crown of Castile in 1497. The Merinids, akin to the Almoravids and Almohads, were also a nomadic tribal confederation based in Fez, whose decline led them to focus on defending their heartland rather than the coastal territories. Thus, by the time Ceuta and Melilla were occupied by the Iberian crowns, they had long been disconnected from any centralized imperial structure.
Successive dynasties, such as the Wattasids and Saadians, launched military campaigns against these enclaves in the 16th and 17th centuries, but these were largely unsuccessful. Although these dynasties shared a theocratic element where a spiritual leader or sultan united tribal confederations to form an empire, they were fundamentally separate entities, lacking institutional, administrative, or dynastic continuity, often embroiled in civil wars that fragmented previous borders. In light of the difficult task of justifying political continuity, Moroccan nationalism often resorts to religious arguments, claiming that territories once linked to a sultan through the _bay’ah_—a traditional oath of fealty—should inherently belong to a continuous Maghreb influence reflected in modern borders.
This argument has previously been dismissed by the International Court of Justice, which ruled in 1975 that such religious bonds do not constitute territorial sovereignty or negate the modern right to self-determination. Moreover, if the Moroccan regime adhered strictly to the logic of _bay’ah_ and historical maps, the notion of Greater Morocco would extend to southern Spain and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. However, to maintain international credibility and expand its territory post-independence in 1956, radical nationalism deliberately excluded these regions from its irredentist maps.
The Colonial Era: Protectorates Without Ceuta and Melilla
Ceuta remained under Portuguese control until the Iberian Union, which joined the crowns of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal under Philip II. When Portugal regained independence in 1640, Ceuta remained under Castilian rule. Since their incorporation in the 15th and 16th centuries, both Ceuta and Melilla were fully integrated territories within the Iberian crowns, akin to Granada, which had been conquered from the Nazaries, or the Canary Islands. They were never categorized as colonies or dependent territories, unlike the Americas, but were constitutionally and legally embedded within the structure of the Kingdom.
Consequently, when European powers established protectorates over Moroccan territory in the early 20th century, Ceuta and Melilla were not included in the colonial administrations and retained their previous status. A new conflict between Spain and Morocco from 1859 to 1860 left the Alaouite Sultanate in ruins, with Spain imposing a hefty indemnity through the Treaty of Wad-Ras, marking the beginning of Spanish colonial presence in Morocco. The financial strain forced the sultan to borrow increasingly from European banks, which provided the perfect pretext for France and Spain to establish protectorates in 1912. The Spanish zone included northern regions like the Rif and Yebala, with capital in Tetuán, and the southern strip of Cabo Juby, while Tangier was established as an international zone in 1923.
In 1956, as Morocco gained independence from France, it also laid claim to the entirety of the Alaouite Sultanate’s territory prior to the protectorates, regaining the northern Spanish protectorate in April of the same year and Tangier in October. Cabo Juby followed in 1958, and Ifni was ceded in 1969. However, the ideas propagated by intellectuals such as Allal el Fassi, the founder and ideologist of the Istiqlal Party and the Greater Morocco thesis, had profoundly influenced the political elite, evolving into state doctrine. Morocco's aspirations extended beyond the restoration of pre-1912 borders, culminating in the 1975 Green March, during which Morocco occupied Spanish Sahara, contravening UN decolonization principles, the Hague Tribunal's ruling, and the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination.
At the time of independence, Morocco also sought to integrate Ceuta and Melilla into its emerging state. In 1960, leveraging the decolonization process sanctioned by UN Resolution 1514, Rabat attempted to include Ceuta and Melilla in the list of territories pending decolonization, alongside Western Sahara and Gibraltar, among others. However, this initiative never gained traction due to the distinct political-administrative status of the territories on the list, which lacked full political rights for their inhabitants. In contrast, Ceuta and Melilla had never been treated as colonies; they were directly governed by the Crown of Castile as military enclaves and were woven into Spain's territorial organization like the rest of the peninsula and insular territories. The 1978 Constitution guarantees each city one deputy and two senators, and since 1995 they have been autonomous cities.
Since Morocco's independence and the resurgence of claims over Ceuta and Melilla, Spain has chosen to abstain from engaging in this debate. Upholding international law, Spain does not recognize any dispute and has rejected bilateral initiatives, such as the joint reflection group proposed by Hassan II in 1987 regarding the future of these cities. Spain's position rests on the assertion that sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla predates the establishment of the contemporary Moroccan state, and that both cities are integral parts of Spanish territory, equal to any other region.
The history of Ceuta and Melilla mirrors that of numerous other borders. Like many territories globally, they were incorporated through conquest, a method of acquisition that was once accepted until the UN Charter and the post-World War II legal system prohibited the use of force. This method facilitated the expansion of the Almoravids and Almohads into Al-Andalus, as well as the crowns of Castile and Aragon, and later the European colonial empires of the 19th century. Therefore, the distinction today is not about the legitimacy of past conquests or the treaties that sanctioned them, but rather about what transpired post-conquest. In regions where powers established colonial orders and subjugated populations, international law recognized the right to self-determination. Conversely, those territories that were integrated into modern state structures, with citizens enjoying equal rights, are exempt from such claims.
As reported by elordenmundial.com.
