Understanding the Fragile Relationship Between Spain and Morocco
It would be a catastrophic outcome if the most radical elements, which contribute to escalating tensions between Morocco and Spain, were to impose their agenda. This situation has been exacerbated by the emergence of hate speech, violent episodes, hostile attitudes, and racist gestures directed at immigrants. In such a sensitive context, any incident can acquire a significance far beyond what it is initially attributed to. Therefore, it is crucial that the two primary Spanish political forces, the People’s Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), uphold their state responsibilities and avoid allowing electoral debates or radical positions to drag them into a confrontational dynamic. Such a scenario could result in a loss of control not only in the political realm but also in the forms and language used in discourse. The responsibility of major parties is particularly significant during times like these, where there is a temptation to transform real tensions into instruments for political gain, even at the risk of fueling a dynamic that may later prove difficult to contain.
It is perplexing that a migration issue affecting nearly all European borders with other continents could evolve into a new flashpoint between Spain and Morocco. The 2002 crisis involving the Perejil Island incident serves as a reminder of how a relatively minor event almost sparked a serious escalation between two neighboring countries. Given this background, the presence of former Prime Minister José María Aznar in Ceuta at a particularly sensitive time in the city is ill-timed. His visit, coupled with a near-heroic evocation of that crisis, including references to the military operation on July 17, 2002, when a contingent arrived via helicopters to evict five members of Moroccan auxiliary forces from the island, seems incompatible with the prudence demanded by the current situation. Aznar's visit can be likened to a return of Odysseus, laden with symbols, memories, and heroic gestures that risk reopening old wounds and feeding a narrative of confrontation. In times of tension, resurrecting the most conflictual episodes from the past as symbols of resolve may offer political benefits, but it also risks reigniting sentiments and perceptions that should be kept in check.
Fostering Cooperation Instead of Conflict
Common sense should prevail. Spain and Morocco are too close to afford confrontation and too interconnected to ignore the consequences of an escalation. There exists a profound economic, commercial, migratory, and, above all, security interdependence between the two nations. While their interests are not identical and their relations are fraught with disagreements and tensions, they are too numerous and significant for a crisis to be resolved without incurring costs for both parties. Because of this interdependence, what occurs on one side of the Strait inevitably has repercussions on the other. The stability of one is, to a large extent, intertwined with the interests of the other. Political responsibility does not lie in demonstrating who can take the most hardline stance, but rather in who has the foresight to prevent a dispute from escalating into a crisis.
Additionally, there is a matter that should be kept separate from this growing tension: the partisan exploitation of the history of Western Sahara. It is unconvincing that certain sectors of the Spanish right seem to have rediscovered the Sahrawi tragedy, presenting the events of 1975 as if they can be solely explained by a misguided decision of the last Franco regime. The historical responsibility of Spain in the decolonization process is a topic that deserves thorough analysis, but using it as a pretext to fuel current confrontations with Morocco does not contribute to understanding the past or resolving present issues. Sahrawis should also refrain from being misled by this illusion. No one should seriously expect that the potential ascendance of the PP or Vox to La Moncloa would translate into a Spanish intervention to 'liberate' the Sahara. Utilizing the Sahrawi issue as a political or electoral argument is one thing; assuming the diplomatic, economic, strategic, and human costs of an open rupture with Morocco is quite another.
From a strictly Sahrawi perspective, we should also refrain from wishing for a confrontational dynamic between Spain and Morocco. It must be stated clearly: those who believe that tension between the two countries automatically opens up an opportunity for the Sahrawi cause are mistaken. There are those among us who seem to think that a turbulent river benefits fishermen. However, Sahrawis have no interest in seeing Spain and Morocco clash, nor in becoming temporary beneficiaries of a crisis that we would ultimately pay for. Our gains will come when neither country is forced to sacrifice our interests to defend their own. Our advantage lies not in Spain and Morocco engaging in confrontation using the Sahara as a battleground or a dispute argument, but rather in both nations finding avenues for understanding and cooperation that also accommodate our legitimate interests.
Our history places us in a unique position. The historical ties with Spain, our geographical, cultural, and human realities, along with our inevitable future coexistence with Morocco, could transform the Sahara into a meeting space rather than a line of fracture. If we can look towards the future with realism, we could aspire to play that role: being a bridge between two countries that, due to their proximity and shared interests, are destined to understand each other.
This may be one of the perspective shifts that we Sahrawis need: to stop viewing our relationship with Spain and Morocco solely through the lens of conflict and begin to ask how we can turn our historical and geographical position into an opportunity. This is not about choosing one side over the other, but rather about contributing to finding solutions that allow both nations to understand each other while also respecting our aspirations. For instance, the potential acknowledgment through law of the nationality of Sahrawis originating from the former Spanish Sahara and their descendants could serve as a concrete expression of the historical ties that bind us to Spain without becoming a tool of confrontation with Morocco.
Experience demonstrates that crises do not always begin with grand decisions. Sometimes, they are triggered by small incidents that are not met with sufficient restraint. When politics becomes subordinate to public pressure, electoral logic, or the need to demonstrate firmness, exercising prudence and regaining the capacity to de-escalate and normalize may become significantly more challenging. In 2002, during the Perejil crisis, the United States played an essential role in facilitating a negotiated exit between two allied countries. However, the current international context is markedly different. The new U.S. administration and the wars in Ukraine and Iran have altered priorities and multiplied international flashpoints. For this reason, Spain and Morocco should be even more aware that the primary responsibility for preventing an escalation lies with them.
In such a close and interdependent relationship, prudence is not a concession to an adversary; it is a means of safeguarding one’s own interests. Spain and Morocco are too close to afford conflict and too united by their interests to allow tensions to spiral out of control. Moreover, Sahrawis stand to gain too much from their understanding to become, once again, hostages to their confrontation.
As reported by elplural.com.
