The meeting recorded in the archive titled "Conversation with General Franco" took place on Friday, June 7, 1935, at 1:30 PM, lasting slightly over half an hour. Four days later, Colonel Jouart, the military attaché at the French Embassy in Spain, reported to the Minister of War, addressing the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff. His conversation partner was Francisco Franco, who had recently been appointed head of the Spanish army's General Staff at the age of 42. During this period, Spain remained a republic.
Jouart begins by painting a vivid portrait of Franco: "Very young, very ardent, with a very open and military demeanor, the general speaks in somewhat poor, yet quite understandable French." The cordiality characterized this initial in-depth meeting, which Franco had requested. He expressed his concerns over the state of his army, emphasizing the need for it to be improved, reorganized, rearmed, and retrained. The conversation swiftly shifted to Morocco.
This shift was intentional, as Jouart insists. Franco did not merely invite a foreign colleague to discuss military matters; he sought to convey a message to the French authorities. The name Ifni emerged prominently in this context, at the heart of a proposal for understanding between colonial powers.
"Conversation with General Franco," penned by Colonel Jouart, military attaché at the French Embassy in Spain, and addressed to the Minister of War, General Staff, 2nd Bureau (S.A.E.), was dated June 11, 1935, in Madrid. It pertains to the discussion held on June 7, 1935, between Franco and Jouart, particularly focusing on Spanish claims to Ifni. This document is preserved in the SHD archives of Vincennes under the reference GR7 NN9 440.
The Spanish occupation of Ifni dates back to the previous year, and this archive sheds light on its diplomatic ramifications. Simply taking possession of a territory is insufficient; it is also necessary to negotiate its boundaries with neighboring colonial powers, organize its control, and prevent conflicts arising from its encirclement.
From a Disappeared Settlement to a Colonial Claim
To comprehend this conversation in Madrid, one must look back well before Franco's era. The Spanish argument is rooted in Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, a Castilian settlement established on the Atlantic coast of Africa in the late 15th century, which was subsequently abandoned in the 16th century. The memory of this settlement has long fueled Spanish claims against Morocco.
Following the Hispano-Moroccan War of 1859-1860, the Treaty of Tétouan, also known as the Treaty of Wad-Ras, signed on April 26, 1860, provided a conventional basis for this claim. Its Article 8 stipulated the cession of territory to Spain for establishing a fishery at the site of the former Santa Cruz. Sultan Mohammed IV accepted this provision following a military defeat, indicating that the concession was a consequence of war, not a free agreement among equal partners.
However, identifying Santa Cruz with Ifni is contentious, and historical research has illustrated the reconstruction of the past that accompanies the legitimization of the colony. It would be misleading to claim that Spanish sovereignty has been continuously exercised since the 15th century. The former settlement, the 19th-century diplomatic concession, and the effective occupation of the 20th century are three distinct realities.
The colonial partition of 1912 adds another layer to this narrative. France imposed its protectorate over most of Morocco, while the Franco-Spanish convention of November 27 of the same year organized their respective positions. Ifni represents a different case from other areas under Spanish protection; Madrid claims direct possession. This small Atlantic territory finds itself surrounded by the French zone along its land borders.
This geography explains why Paris is interested in a Spanish settlement. On a European political map, Ifni may seem to be a matter for Madrid. However, on Moroccan soil, its occupation inevitably impacts routes, populations, and French military operations.
Political Analysis and Franco’s Ambitions
In April 1934, Colonel Osvaldo Capaz effectively took possession of Ifni. He landed on April 5, and the official takeover was marked on April 6 with the raising of the republican flag. The man whom Franco praised in his conversation with Jouart was thus the military actor behind the occupation, which occurred under the government of Alejandro Lerroux, and was not an order given by Franco himself.
By June 1935, this success was recent enough to structure the discussion referenced in this archive. Jouart notes, "After a great praise of General Capaz, whom he holds in high regard, General Franco concluded our discussion on this matter concerning Morocco, inviting me to come back and talk with him again 'as a comrade.'" This praise connects the two scenes: the capture on the Moroccan coast and the conversation in Madrid. For Franco, it was now essential to consolidate what had been achieved. For Jouart, it was crucial to understand Spanish intentions without compromising French interests. Ifni thus emerged as a topic of negotiation as well as a military position.
The central passage of the report directly reveals this logic. According to Jouart's account, Franco stated, "The Spaniards, he told me, have just and reasonable claims to make, particularly today regarding Ifni...; it must be recognized that, in some respects, the French are themselves in a delicate military and political situation, which is difficult to alter without danger for you and even for us... Therefore, we need to reach a general and precise agreement between us, which will allow for close and trusting collaboration, good neighborliness, and good friendship that are necessary for both France and Spain, from both a political and military standpoint, to maintain order and security in the Cherifian Empire…"
This maneuver cleverly presents the satisfaction of Spanish demands as a prerequisite for mutual security. Franco does not deny the French difficulties; he utilizes them to advocate for an arrangement. Behind the formulas of neighborliness lies a transaction: resolving disputes between Europeans to make their dominance less vulnerable.
These disputes are not imaginary. The delimitation of Ifni has caused friction, and a provisional arrangement was renewed in March 1935. Madrid also sought that year to obtain a land corridor linking Ifni to Tarfaya, between the Oued Assaka and the Oued Drâa. France aimed to preserve its positions and control over the Noun region.
This context illuminates the report but should not replace it. Franco did not detail the desired corridor or potential compensations. Jouart expressly recognizes that his interlocutor avoided specifics. The archive establishes an approach toward rapprochement, not the conclusion of a territorial agreement.
Here lies the answer to the French question: Paris does not observe Ifni from the outside. It monitors a territory adjacent to its zone, the consequences of Spanish ambitions, and the possibilities for military cooperation. Border rivalries do not negate the shared colonial interests.
However, an absence runs through the entire conversation. The "two interested governments" are those of France and Spain. Morocco is mentioned, but its government does not participate in this discussion about its territory. The "order" invoked primarily refers to the stability of the arrangement imposed by the occupying powers.
The other significant interest of the report lies in the moral portrait of Franco. The favorable impression from the opening lines does not lead to an unqualified endorsement. Jouart concludes with an explicit reservation: "I have been in Madrid for too short a time to know the degree of trust that can be placed in General Franco, whose ambition is, it is said, as great as his youth allows. I believe I must therefore remain on a prudent and just reserve with him until further notice." The "ambition" is emphasized, but the phrase "it is said" matters: Jouart reports a reputation, not an intimate understanding. Nonetheless, he adds: "But I must acknowledge that among the Spanish generals I have already approached, he is certainly with General Martinez Cabrera, the Commander of the War School, the only one who received me with the confident and cordial military camaraderie that allows for useful conversations and future relations. The future will tell me what I can potentially derive from it."
The judgment remains professional. Jouart evaluates less the personal virtue of the general than the utility of a relationship. A warm welcome can facilitate future exchanges; it does not exempt one from caution.
Franco, for his part, nurtures this closeness while reminding of Spanish susceptibilities. He wishes for his officers not to endure "certain criticisms that can sometimes hurt the military and national self-esteem of those who do not know well enough the jovial and 'Farsante' (jokester, NDLR) character of the French…" He thus calls for military cooperation, but also for recognition of their respective dignity. Beneath the humor noted by Jouart lies a refusal of a relationship where the French would distribute evaluations and reprimands.
Colonel Jouart identified his interlocutor's method: "The conversation quickly took the form of a monologue from the general, who seemed to have sought this meeting to easily express his desire to see an agreement reached as soon as possible between the two interested governments on all still disputed issues, so as to resolve once and for all the differences that still separate us in Morocco." Beneath the amiable demeanor, Jouart perceives a directed conversation. Franco speaks extensively to steer the relationship but remains general enough not to commit to a precise solution.
History will give this meeting a resonance that its participants cannot yet measure. Franco would participate in the military uprising of July 1936, take control of the insurgent camp, and impose, after the 1939 victory, a dictatorship maintained until his death in 1975.
The cordiality has a practical translation. Jouart requests permission to visit disputed points in Spanish Morocco. This recognition was not an improvised idea: "This trip is indeed essential from all points of view, and besides, Mr. PONSOT himself invited me to prioritize it in my plans during the interview he granted me in Paris on March 25, before my departure for Madrid." Thus, French interest preceded Franco's invitation. The colonel wishes to confront discourse with reality. Traversing contested areas, understanding their layout, and meeting local leaders would allow for a better appreciation of Spanish claims.
Franco immediately agrees and suggests October due to the heat. He then introduces a third country into the exchange: "He added that this trip would probably be as interesting for me as for General Kühlenthal (German Military Attaché), who has already requested and obtained to make a complete tour of Spanish Morocco and even into the Ifni zone, probably at the end of September: This Military Attaché, Franco told me, was also to link this trip with a journey to French Morocco, where he planned to stay a few days."
This mention deserves attention. The conversation had begun with a discussion of the French defensive setup against Hitler's Germany; it now returns to access for a German officer to Moroccan territories. Franco informs Jouart that another attaché is already benefiting from such facilities. This can be interpreted as a way to enhance the offer made to the Frenchman or even to stimulate his interest.
Beyond these conversations, the occupation takes root on the ground. In the following years, the Spaniards develop a network of tracks connecting posts to Sidi Ifni to transport soldiers and equipment. Territorial control is constructed through these communications as much as through garrisons.
With Moroccan independence in 1956, the perspective shifts. The end of the protectorates does not automatically lead to the Spanish departure from Ifni, which Madrid defends as a distinct status. For Morocco, independence remains unfinished as long as foreign possessions persist. The territorial claim is coupled with the action of the Liberation Army, creating tensions that lead to the war of 1957-1958.
On November 23, 1957, fighters from the Aït Baâmrane simultaneously attacked several Spanish positions. This date marks a decisive rupture in local history. The populations that Jouart's report leaves out of the conversation become direct actors in challenging the occupation.
The conflict encompasses multiple theaters and complex political relationships. In Ifni, the Spaniards evacuate posts and concentrate their defense around Sidi Ifni. They retain the city and its perimeter but lose control of a greater area, illustrating the intricate nature of colonial dynamics in the region.
As reported by fr.le360.ma.
