The Roots of the Ceuta and Melilla Crisis
The ongoing crisis concerning the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla did not emerge suddenly in August, nor can it be understood solely through the lens of the thousands of individuals gathered at a border that Morocco intermittently opens and closes based on its political agenda. To grasp the true turning point, one must look back to March 2022, when Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez decided to endorse Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara, thus breaking a long-standing Spanish diplomatic position. This pivotal decision has had far-reaching consequences that remain difficult to fully assess. Rabat gained far more than a favorable diplomatic letter regarding its claims over Western Sahara; it reinforced the notion that pressure yields results, demonstrating that Spain is willing to alter its strategic stance when the cost of maintaining it becomes too high. Consequently, Morocco has felt emboldened, interpreting every Spanish concession as a sign of weakness, suggesting that yielding under pressure only invites further demands.
To better understand the current situation, it is essential to shift away from a strictly Spanish perspective and instead view the geopolitical landscape from Rabat. Moroccan expansionism is rooted in a historical doctrine and ideological framework that predates the current monarchy. The concept of Greater Morocco, articulated by figures like Allal el Fassi and the Istiqlal nationalism, envisioned borders that extended well beyond internationally recognized boundaries, encroaching upon neighboring territories. While this maximalist cartography was not entirely adopted as official state policy, elements of its territorial logic have persisted and manifested in Moroccan foreign policy over the years. The 1975 occupation of Western Sahara stands as the most blatant example. Ceuta and Melilla continue to occupy space within the Moroccan national imagination, and certain nationalist narratives even extend their territorial ambitions to additional areas.
Morocco's Strategic Patience and International Alliances
Recent remarks by Morocco's Minister of Justice regarding the patience of Morocco concerning Ceuta and Melilla underscore the significance of this methodical approach. Morocco has mastered the art of waiting, strategically accumulating leverage, creating dependencies, exploiting vulnerabilities, and choosing the precise moment when a previously unthinkable claim begins to seem debatable. The notion that Rabat would attempt a military takeover of Ceuta in the immediate future mischaracterizes its strategy and misses the larger picture. Contemporary pressure on a territory can be exerted through demographics, economic measures, migration, diplomacy, information dissemination, trade relations, and the gradual construction of a perceived conflict. Before any discussions about territorial rights can occur, it is crucial that the existence of a dispute is acknowledged. This represents a danger that the Spanish government appears determined to overlook.
Morocco has spent years meticulously building the international conditions it requires. It has strengthened its strategic and military alliance with the United States, significantly enhanced cooperation with Israel, and secured U.S. recognition of its claimed sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020. Following this, Morocco devoted substantial diplomatic resources to expanding such recognition and promoting its autonomy plan as the only viable solution to a conflict that remains legally classified as a territory pending decolonization. The primary objective has been to effectively close the Sahrawi front under favorable terms for Rabat.
In light of recent events, it is difficult to ignore the statements made in 2020 by Saadeddine El Othmani, the former head of the Moroccan government, asserting that Ceuta and Melilla are Moroccan territories. This was initially dismissed by many as an overreach, an imprudent statement from a prime minister who had gone too far. However, just days ago, El Othmani revisited the topic during an interview on Lebanese television. When asked by the prominent journalist Sami Kleib if he maintained his controversial stance from 2020, El Othmani's response was particularly telling. He dismissed the characterization of his claim as mere opinion, asserting instead that Ceuta and Melilla are "de facto occupied" and that this view enjoys national consensus in Morocco.
Moroccan policy progresses through phases and adapts to the resistance it encounters. Initially, it solidifies a position, then increases the costs associated with disputing it, and ultimately shifts the focal point towards the next objective. In this context, the use of migration at the Spanish border must be analyzed. It is implausible to argue that a state with one of the most sophisticated security apparatuses in the region, capable of maintaining a massive military presence in Western Sahara for decades, is unable to monitor a mere thirteen kilometers of land border when it truly decides to do so. Mass entries into Ceuta often coincide with politically significant moments. Surveillance tightens when Rabat needs to assert its status as an indispensable partner to Europe and relaxes when it aims to remind Spain of the potential consequences of neglecting this partnership.
This pattern was evident in 2021 when thousands, including numerous minors, entered Ceuta amid a diplomatic crisis sparked by the hospitalization of Sahrawi President Brahim Ghali in Spain. The European Union subsequently condemned the use of migration and minors as a tool of political pressure. Five years later, it is hard to feign surprise. When such mechanisms repeat, they cease to be border accidents and become a state behavior pattern. The Spanish error lies in responding to each episode as if it were an isolated incident, negotiating a return to normalcy, and subsequently celebrating that normalcy as a diplomatic triumph. However, in a bilateral relationship built on successive crises, normalcy may merely represent the interlude during which the next form of pressure is prepared.
Algeria recognized decades ago an aspect of the Sahrawi conflict that Europe continues to view almost exclusively through a humanitarian lens. The defense of the Sahrawi people's right to self-determination has a clear legal dimension, underpinned by the international status of the territory and decades of United Nations resolutions. It also possesses a geopolitical dimension that no serious state in North Africa can afford to ignore. An independent Sahrawi Republic represents both a territorial and political barrier to Moroccan expansion southward and profoundly alters the regional balance of power. For Algeria, the existence of this strategic dam directly impacts its national security. For the Sahrawis, who have endured the consequences of Moroccan expansionism for half a century, this is not an abstract hypothesis; it is a lived reality.
Spain must come to terms with the fact that the Sahrawi issue is far more intertwined with its own security than some governments have been willing to acknowledge. For years, the gradual abandonment of Spain’s traditional position was framed as the necessary price for purchasing stability with Morocco. However, current experiences are proving the exact opposite. Spain conceded on the issue Rabat deemed paramount, yet the demands did not vanish; they merely shifted. Western Sahara was never the endpoint of Moroccan territorial policy, and those of us who have studied Moroccan nationalism for decades never doubted this. If a power discovers that pressure alters its neighbor’s positions, the rational conclusion from its perspective is to increase the pressure, not to abandon its subsequent goals.
Thus, Ceuta and Melilla find themselves in a particularly precarious phase. The immediate danger does not necessarily lie in military action or sudden annexation but in conditioning Spain, Europe, and international public opinion to view both cities as pending disputes. A migration crisis today, a ministerial declaration tomorrow, a subsequent trade controversy, maps, media campaigns, historical claims, border incidents, and calculated periods of détente could collectively create a political framework that Spain would vehemently reject today. Time serves as a tool of power when one actor possesses a decades-long strategy while the other operates within the confines of the next electoral cycle.
In this scenario, the Spanish government’s response remains challenging to justify. The policy pursued since 2022 has conflated stability with concession and cooperation with dependency. Each crisis has been met with a gradual acceptance of the framework imposed by those capable of provoking it. While Rabat contemplates historical terms, Spain responds administratively to each episode. As Morocco consolidates its positions, Madrid attempts to reclaim a facade of normalcy. And while both nations publicly tout an excellent relationship, prominent political figures across the border assert claims over Spanish cities and emphasize that their country knows how to be patient.
Spain is facing one of the most significant challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity in decades, while part of its political class continues to behave as if recognizing the nature of the problem could be more perilous than the problem itself. The pressure originates from Rabat, but its effectiveness hinges on the perceived weakness of its adversary. Moroccan expansionism has demonstrated for half a century its ability to wait, apply pressure, and capitalize on every retreat of its opponents. After Western Sahara came the rhetoric surrounding Ceuta and Melilla. Spain should reflect on how much political territory it is willing to concede before understanding that for those who interpret each concession as a victory, the last concession is never truly the last.
As reported by abc.es.
