Financial Implications of European Cohesion Policies
To begin with the numbers, Spain stands out as the third-largest beneficiary of the European cohesion policy, securing approximately €35 billion in funding for the period between 2021 and 2027, following Poland and Italy. Among Spain's territories, the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, which became part of the European Union following Madrid's accession in 1986, are significant recipients of these funds. For instance, Ceuta alone is set to receive €32 million through the ongoing European Regional Development Fund (FEDER) program. These two cities also enjoy a unique European regulatory framework, particularly regarding tax and customs policies, which further enhances their economic position within the Union.
Political Costs and Challenges in Migration Management
In addition to the cohesion funds, Spain is allocated more than €1.5 billion from three European funds dedicated to asylum, migration, border security, and internal security during the same period. Recently, the European Commissioner announced €114 million in emergency aid, with approximately €28 million earmarked specifically for Ceuta. The financial burden is expected to increase, as the Spanish government has requested additional support from Frontex, Europol, and the European Asylum Agency. The commitment to territorial cohesion, social inclusion, and border surveillance reflects a long-standing European solidarity with Madrid that has been consistently budgeted for over four decades.
However, the political cost associated with the current situation in Ceuta is substantial and comes at a precarious time. The ongoing crisis has reopened the migration divide that the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum, effective from June 12, 2026, aimed to resolve. After years of deliberations and divisions, European nations reached a fragile balance between the responsibility of border states and the solidarity of other member states, while also developing partnerships with countries of origin and transit, primarily Morocco. On August 1, at the behest of Italy and Denmark, 22 member states sent a joint letter to European leaders demanding an urgent meeting. The letter explicitly mentioned national regularization policies as a potential 'pull factor,' implicitly targeting Madrid's approach.
In response, Pedro Sánchez invoked European solidarity, criticizing neighboring countries for their failure to support Spain amidst pressures on an external Union border. When European leaders convened on August 4, they collectively emphasized their support for Spain and expressed confidence in Morocco's cooperation, with the Commission acknowledging Rabat's role. However, a majority of member states called for a firmer stance, advocating for enhanced external border security, combating human trafficking, expediting returns, and deepening cooperation with third countries. Italy revived the idea of creating migration hubs in safe third countries. This rapid escalation has highlighted the limitations of the Pact and reopened the debate on migration policies for the remainder of the term.
The crisis in Ceuta raises critical questions about the extent of European solidarity and who should bear the costs associated with the lack of accountability from a member state. Solidarity among member states is one of the foundational principles of the European Union. When a nation faces a natural disaster or external aggression, neighboring countries are expected to lend assistance. However, this solidarity should not lead to the communalization of irresponsibility. There is a fundamental difference between aiding a state facing an unforeseen crisis and expecting twenty-six partners to indefinitely shoulder the consequences of a member state's political choices.
The situation in Ceuta is particularly pressing given the already substantial European solidarity directed towards it. The EU finances, protects, and supports this border in Africa because its member states recognize Ceuta and Melilla as integral parts of Spanish territory and, by extension, as external borders of Europe. Nevertheless, Madrid would be mistaken to take this support for granted. By continuously asking its partners to share the burden of irresponsible migration choices, Spain risks undermining the European consensus that currently supports these enclaves. The concern is not that European governments will collectively question the Spanish identity of these territories, but that certain states, political parties, or public opinions may begin to wonder why Europe should indefinitely finance and protect African borders while Spain takes on less and less of the associated responsibilities. In this context, Madrid should prioritize preserving rather than testing the political solidarity of its European partners, as neither Morocco nor the European Union is obliged to act as Spain's caretaker.
As reported by fr.le360.ma.
