Yago Rodríguez is a Spanish analyst highly regarded for his expertise in military and geopolitical issues. As the director and owner of The Political Room, he also runs the educational channel Cosas Militares and frequently contributes to Spanish media and television discussions. His viewpoints play a significant role in shaping public discourse in Spain regarding defense, security, and relations with Morocco.
One commendable quality of Rodríguez is his ability to distill complex concepts from strategic studies into narratives that are both comprehensible and media-friendly. He adeptly manages numbers, military scenarios, and historical comparisons. However, the real concern arises when narratives begin to replace empirical evidence.
In a matter of weeks, Rodríguez has portrayed the migration crisis in Ceuta as a "hybrid war conducted by Morocco," urged Spain to "take up arms," escalated the perception of the risk of war from "distant" to "low," and ultimately concluded that "Morocco will militarily attack us if it believes it can defeat us." This sequence is striking, but the publicly available evidence has not advanced at the same pace.
Building Backward Attribution
Rodríguez's thesis hinges on three key facts: Morocco typically maintains tight control over its borders; tens of thousands managed to breach this control on July 30; and Moroccan authorities did not prevent them during critical hours. From these observations, Rodríguez infers that Rabat deliberately allowed this to happen. He moves from this supposed tolerance to political instrumentalization, and then to the certainty of a state-sponsored attack aimed at achieving a strategic objective.
While such conclusions are possible, they are not substantiated merely by the scale of the event. A serious analysis should consider several competing hypotheses: an exceptional failure in the control system, operational saturation, delayed reactions, local disobedience, spontaneous mobilization fueled by rumors, criminal exploitation of a misinterpreted judicial decision, tactical tolerance, or genuine state instrumentalization. Rodríguez quickly selects the most hostile hypothesis and frames it as the explanatory model for everything that has occurred subsequently.
On August 2, Rodríguez himself acknowledged that proving the existence of an order from Rabat "would require evidence." He was correct, yet he immediately created a dilemma wherein every possibility leads to the same conclusion: If Morocco was unable to prevent the breach, it is not a reliable security partner. If it could have prevented it and chose not to, it exercised a form of coercion against Spain. The first possibility may justify Spain reinforcing its border and reducing operational dependence, but it does not automatically convert the second into an established fact. The prudent recommendation may hold even if state attribution is not demonstrated. Rodríguez conflates these two issues so that the reasonableness of one artificially bolsters the certainty of the other.
An Unrefutable Hypothesis
Rodríguez's methodology becomes even more problematic when he employs the concept of "plausible deniability." If no Moroccan order is apparent, its absence does not diminish the credibility of the hypothesis: it would suggest that the operation was deliberately designed to leave no evidence. If Morocco cooperates in the return of over 90% of those who entered Ceuta, this cooperation does not contradict the hypothesis; rather, it is redefined as the final phase of the operation, once the damage has been inflicted. If Moroccan forces prevent further concentrations on August 15, this would signify neither rectification nor cooperation, but rather a tactical retreat. If no new incidents occur, Morocco would simply be waiting for another opportunity.
This is how an unrefutable thesis is constructed: both the evidence and its absence confirm the same conclusion. A genuinely analytical hypothesis must specify which facts could weaken it—prior orders to contain movements? Arrests of organizers? Operational records revealing surprise or saturation? Immediate cooperation? Lack of state coordination? If no observation can alter the diagnosis, we are no longer dealing with an investigative method, but with a closed system of interpretation.
The most revealing statement appears in Rodríguez's August 29 article: "In strategic terms, it was a hybrid attack. No serious security analyst doubts this." Yet, the article itself cites an assessment attributed to Spanish intelligence stating that Rabat had not planned the influx. The Spanish government has also claimed that there is no evidence of Moroccan government involvement while highlighting subsequent cooperation from Morocco. While it is legitimate to be skeptical of the government’s version, as authorities can make mistakes or strive to maintain diplomatic relations, their position at least demonstrates that the attribution is contested. Therefore, stating that "no serious analyst" doubts this assertion does not constitute a valid argument but rather serves to preemptively exclude from the debate anyone who might demand further evidence.
Additionally, when contradictory interpretations exist, the analyst must clarify why one source is deemed more trustworthy than another. They cannot decree that the controversy is settled simply by professional assertion.
On television, Rodríguez has acknowledged that it is "very difficult to see" a direct intention behind such actions. A few days later, he was already discussing an obvious attack. He subsequently warned of a "more ambitious" Moroccan action and concluded that Morocco would launch a military attack when it believed it could prevail. These represent three different levels that are conflated: the possibility that Morocco might instrumentalize a crisis, the probability that it did so in this specific instance, and the assertion that there exists a permanent military intent waiting for a favorable balance of power.
A capability does not demonstrate intent. A hypothesis does not equate to attribution. And a planning scenario is not a prophecy. Spain must consider even the least likely scenarios; this is a basic obligation for any state. However, studying the possibility of a Moroccan attack does not equate to proving that Morocco has decided to attack.
Rodríguez invokes historical analogies such as the Falklands in 1982, Kargil in 1999, Russia and Ukraine, and the Persil islet in 2002, all emphasizing that states can miscalculate. However, an analogy is meant to construct scenarios, not to replace the specific evidence pertinent to the case under study. If every crisis is immediately defined as an attack, the available space for verification, dialogue, and correction diminishes.
Argentina conducted an overt military invasion of the Falklands. Kargil involved organized military infiltration. Russia prepared an observable conventional invasion. The Ceuta crisis was marked by chaotic human mobilization fueled by rumors and criminal networks, with the potential state direction remaining contentious. The fact that two crises can lead to escalation does not imply that they share the same actors, mechanisms, objectives, or chains of command.
Rodríguez's language ultimately reveals the structure of his model. He describes Moroccans as "very tolerant of conflict," claiming that "money does not concern them," characterizing Morocco as "deeply aggressive," and asserting that Spain must educate its population on the "level of aggression of what we have to the south." This perspective shifts from analyzing decisions made by specific elites under certain circumstances to portraying Morocco as a collective, immutable, and threatening entity.
Cooperation is interpreted as cunning, moderation as hesitation, military modernization as offensive intent, interdependence as vulnerability, Spanish concessions as fuel for aggression, and any disagreement as confirmation of expansionism. A model that explains all possible behaviors before they are even observed possesses limited analytical power.
The inclusion of the Canary Islands alongside Ceuta and Melilla is particularly significant. Both cities are the subject of a well-known political dispute. To claim that the Canary Islands fall under the same project necessitates specific evidence of a contemporary and equivalent Moroccan state claim. In the absence of such evidence, this association primarily serves to geographically and emotionally broaden the perceived threat.
Rodríguez cites economic and military data that merit examination, not dismissal. Spain has a larger economy and military expenditure; Morocco is modernizing its forces; there exists a trade asymmetry; and Rabat maintains a costly strategic rivalry with Algeria. However, this data alone does not measure a supposed "Moroccan will." His articles also fail to present a reproducible model of the announced "local military balance." Crucial variables are missing: prior alert level, operational theater, logistics, air and naval superiority, reinforcements from the Iberian Peninsula, munitions, support capabilities, European reaction, and the cost of controlling hostile territory.
Furthermore, comparing Spanish expenditures calculated by SIPRI with Moroccan expenditures estimated by IISS risks conflating different methodologies. While the precise numerical report may support an argument, a homogeneous series is necessary. The figures may be individually accurate while being placed within a defective causality. Data describe capabilities and constraints; they do not read states’ intentions.
There is a noted professional proximity between Yago Rodríguez and Ignacio Cembrero: they have participated together in events and programs, The Political Room cites Cembrero's analyses, and Rodríguez has announced joint appearances with him. There is also a partial convergence in their analytical frameworks: Moroccan pressure, networks of influence, expansionism, Spanish vulnerability, and the need for greater firmness. This connection is noteworthy as it helps to elucidate the circulation of a particular narrative concerning Morocco.
However, the public sources examined do not prove that Cembrero directs The Political Room, coordinates its publications, or funds its activities. The intellectual convergence should not be transformed into a conspiracy by the same process that leads Rodríguez to morph indicators into hybrid attacks. Critique must apply to its own assertions the same evidentiary discipline it demands of others.
None of the above necessitates idealizing either state. The crisis should be clarified through a rigorous investigation examining all its dimensions: the origins of mobilization calls, criminal and misinformation networks, anticipatory and management failures on both sides of the border, as well as their subsequent political and media instrumentalization.
Morocco and Spain share the responsibility to prevent further tragedies. However, cooperation should not be conflated with Morocco's obligation to act as Europe's permanent gendarme. The existence of a common border does not automatically convert every failure of control into a hostile operation.
Common security requires reciprocity, coordination, and mutual respect, rather than the unilateral construction of an enemy or an arms race. Preparing for a possible war does not authorize presenting it as probable. Studying capabilities does not allow for the attribution of intentions. And repeating a hypothesis with growing assurance does not transform it into fact.
The paradox is that rhetoric designed to strengthen deterrence can ultimately weaken security. If every crisis is immediately defined as an attack, the space available for verification, dialogue, and correction diminishes. If every Moroccan action confirms a supposedly immutable aggressiveness, no bilateral policy can function outside of escalation. And if the Spanish public is educated to perceive the Southern neighbor as a fundamental enemy, the "miscalculation" that Rodríguez claims to fear ceases to be merely an object of analysis; it becomes a product of its own narrative.
Spain requires strategic analysis. This is precisely why it must rigorously distinguish between data, indicators, hypotheses, attributions, and forecasts. Recent publications by Yago Rodríguez do not demonstrate that Morocco has decided to go to war with Spain. They illustrate how a hypothesis, repeated with sufficient confidence, can eventually appear to take on the semblance of certainty.
As reported by fr.le360.ma.
