The ongoing humanitarian and migratory crisis in Ceuta has illuminated a troubling divide within Spanish and European borders amid the specter of a potential hybrid war. Although Brussels has identified the spread of disinformation linked to Russia and Israel, there remains no solid public evidence to directly attribute the organization of the mass entry of over 70,000 migrants to Rabat. However, the shadow of Moroccan influence lingers over this episode, given the historical territorial disputes and the nature of the border itself.
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez has pointed to the manipulation of narratives as a key trigger for the crisis. In a recent interview on Cadena Ser’s 'Hoy por Hoy', he asserted that disinformation was propagated through networks associated with Russia, Israel, and an "ultra-right international" that uses immigration as a weapon against Spain and Europe. It is essential to clarify that while certain actors have amplified a narrative, this does not equate to proof of orchestrating the initial mobilization or the existence of a coordinated state operation behind it.
Ceuta: A Geopolitical Flashpoint
Ceuta has re-emerged on the European map not merely as a geographical boundary but as a contentious point where migration, sovereignty, misinformation, and geopolitical rivalry converge. Between July 30 and 31, tens of thousands crossed from Morocco into the autonomous city. The Ministry of the Interior initially estimated the number of entries to be between 70,000 and 80,000, though subsequent reports suggested even higher figures. The exact scale of this episode is still debated, but what is undeniable is the extraordinary nature of the crisis and the high number of fatalities recorded during the crossings.
In the lead-up to and during this mass influx, social media acted as a secondary border zone: an unregulated space where false information could spread more rapidly than any patrol. Research by VerificaRTVE documented instances of both real and fabricated images, while Maldita.es identified messages portraying Ceuta as an open gateway to Europe, disseminating misleading interpretations of the legal ramifications of reaching Spanish territory.
The Complex Landscape of Misinformation and Geopolitical Influence
At the core of this second battle lies an actual court ruling, albeit one that has been misinterpreted. On June 29, 2026, the Spanish Supreme Court issued ruling 814/2026, establishing that the rejection procedure at the border, as outlined in the Immigration Law, cannot be applied to individuals intercepted at sea attempting to swim to Ceuta or Melilla. This ruling did not abolish borders, establish an automatic right of entry, or permit free movement across Spain or within the Schengen area. Instead, it mandated that ordinary return procedures with legal safeguards must be applied in such cases.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to clarify messages suggesting that the ruling represented an opening of borders. Their explanation was unequivocal: irregular access to Ceuta does not grant the right to remain in Spain or to move to the mainland or elsewhere in Europe. This seemingly technical legal distinction had significant political ramifications, as social media reduced a complex judicial resolution to a simplistic slogan: "the door is open."
In early August, the European Commission confirmed that it had detected channels linked to Russia that rapidly amplified the Ceuta crisis from July 30. Although the information available does not confirm that Russia orchestrated the arrival of tens of thousands of people, it highlights how Moscow exploits European migratory fractures, impacting security, identity, domestic politics, and trust between member states. A chaotic border generates images; these images evoke emotions, and emotions can fuel political narratives.
Israel's involvement presents a different angle, requiring careful scrutiny. During the crisis, accounts linked to pro-Israel sectors spread the hashtag #FreeCeuta, framing Ceuta and Melilla as "Spanish colonies." However, this does not imply that the Israeli state has intervened in the migratory crisis or that there is an official operation against Spain. It is crucial to distinguish between individual accounts, ideological networks, influential actors, and state structures; conflating them would turn journalism into a factory of unfounded attributions.
While Sánchez has stated that there is no intelligence information linking Moroccan authorities to the mass entry, the broader context cannot be overlooked. Spanish intelligence views the likelihood of ongoing covert actions in a so-called "grey zone"—a space straddling diplomatic normalcy and open conflict—as probable. Among the identified threats are disinformation, cyberattacks, sabotage, and the manipulation of migratory flows. While there is no evidence of Moroccan state planning of the July crisis, investigations are ongoing into the potential degree of complacency or facilitation that may have occurred on the ground.
Ceuta's history is marked by another significant event in May 2021, when around 10,000 people entered the city in just two days following Morocco's relaxation of border controls, coinciding with the hospitalization of Brahim Ghali, the leader of the Polisario Front. The Sánchez government denied any causal relationship between these events. Shortly after that crisis, Spain approved €30 million in aid to support Moroccan authorities in combating irregular immigration—a budget item that the government claimed was already planned prior to the mass entry.
Ceuta and Melilla, two autonomous Spanish cities, are positioned at the external border of the European Union, yet they have unique characteristics concerning Schengen and customs territory. Spain's position is backed by a long historical and legal trajectory, with Ceuta remaining under Spanish sovereignty following the separation from Portugal and recognized in the Treaty of Lisbon of 1668. Meanwhile, Melilla was incorporated into the Crown of Castile in 1497. Documentation from the Spanish Congress affirms these historical claims and the subsequent treaties consolidating Spanish sovereignty.
Morocco, conversely, has maintained a political claim over both cities since its independence in 1956, linked to its historical vision of Greater Morocco. The relationship between Madrid and Rabat cannot be understood without considering Western Sahara. In March 2022, Sánchez's government announced a historic shift in Spain's position, regarding Morocco's autonomy proposal as the "most serious, realistic, and credible" basis for resolving the conflict. This shift strained relations with Algeria, Morocco's main regional rival and historical supporter of the Polisario Front. However, ties between Spain and Algeria have begun to mend, with discussions on renewing the Treaty of Friendship and enhancing bilateral cooperation.
Ultimately, the underlying issue extends beyond Morocco. For years, the European Union has constructed a significant portion of its migration policy on the externalization of border control. Countries like Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia have received cooperation and funding to manage migratory movements before they reach EU territory. While this model provides the immediate benefit of reducing arrivals to Europe, it carries a strategic cost: it transfers part of the control power of the European border to third countries. When relations function smoothly, externalization appears as cooperation; when they deteriorate, it can turn into dependency. Ceuta exemplifies this paradox starkly, where the European border literally begins just beyond a fence, yet its stability is contingent upon the decisions made by authorities on the other side.
As we navigate this complex landscape of influence and evidence, it is crucial to recognize that the term “hybrid war” effectively describes the interplay of military, economic, technological, migratory, diplomatic, and propaganda instruments employed without formally crossing the threshold into armed conflict. Therefore, the true map of interference in Ceuta should not merely draw arrows pointing towards Moscow, Tel Aviv, or Rabat; it must account for varying degrees of certainty. Russia is linked to the amplification of narratives following the onset of the crisis; Israel is associated with specific digital campaigns regarding territorial questions, without implying state responsibility; and while Morocco remains central to the geographical, diplomatic, and territorial equation, the Spanish government asserts that it lacks evidence of direct intervention from Moroccan authorities in orchestrating the influx.
Furthermore, there exists a fourth force, perhaps less visible but more profound: the structural vulnerability of Europe to any migratory crisis that can be weaponized politically.
As reported by elplural.com.
