Understanding the Context of the Constitutional Court's Decision
The recent ruling by the Constitutional Court, identified as Decision No. 26/277 in case number 26/317 dated August 10, 2026, has generated a spectrum of political and legal reactions. The court declared an inability to decide on the referral concerning the constitutionality of Law No. 66.23, which regulates the profession of law in its current form. This outcome did not resolve the anticipated dispute but instead focused on procedural aspects after a full deliberation period of 32 days. Such a development necessitates preliminary observations to contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding practical issues presented before the Constitutional Court.
Analyzing the Legal Framework and the Delay in Decision-Making
The backdrop for the introduction of a new law to organize the legal profession in Morocco, replacing the existing 2008 statute, is characterized by conflicting opinions and disputes that have escalated into a notable struggle between the Ministry of Justice and the Moroccan Bar Association. The Ministry advocates for the new law, citing intentions to reform the sector, as evidenced by its defense in parliament and during prior discussions and seminars on the matter. A crucial observation is that Law No. 66.23 lacks a clear and explicit preamble outlining its rationale, which is essential for understanding its implications. Conversely, the Bar Association views the new legislation as an attempt to diminish the critical roles of defense within the justice system, undermining the core values of independence, self-organization, and the inviolability of the legal profession. They assert that the crisis stems from a flawed methodology that cannot be rectified through amendments and instead calls for a complete withdrawal of this text, as its philosophy and general structure fail to respect the interests of those it affects and the principles of participatory democracy.
To settle this dispute, particularly amidst the ongoing strike by lawyers completely halting their defense duties, the proposed Law No. 66.23 was referred to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on its constitutionality, initiated by a letter from the Speaker of the House of Representatives recorded at the Court's General Secretariat on July 8, 2026. The subsequent ruling, which concluded with an inability to decide due to formal defects in the referral documentation, raises pertinent questions about the decision-making process and the time taken to reach this conclusion.
The court's decision, which took 32 days from the date of referral to finalize its ruling, prompts an inquiry into whether this timeframe was legally compliant, considering that the Moroccan legislator has not prescribed any penalties for the issuance of Constitutional Court decisions beyond the stipulated time limits. The relevant legal provisions distinguish between a one-month period outlined in Article 132 of the Constitution and a thirty-day timeframe specified in Article 26 of Organic Law No. 066.13 pertaining to the Constitutional Court. Notably, Article 132 indicates a one-month decision-making period, which can be expedited to eight days under urgent circumstances upon the government's request, while Article 26 refers to a thirty-day timeline. The legal distinction between a month and thirty days is significant, as a month can encompass either 30 or 31 days, or even 28 or 29 days in certain years. In this case, the court's ruling fell within the legally defined period, as the last day coincided with a holiday, extending the deadline to the next business day, thus adhering to procedural requirements.
However, the length of time taken for the court to arrive at its decision, which ultimately cited procedural deficiencies as the reason for its inability to rule, suggests that the process could have been expedited. The clarity of the formal defect indicated that the court could have promptly addressed the issue to facilitate the efficient operation of constitutional justice, particularly given the complete standstill in the justice sector due to the lawyers' strike. It is essential for the Constitutional Court, ideally, to be above such procedural delays and to handle cases with the wisdom and professionalism expected of it during such critical periods.
Furthermore, the court's ruling raises the question of whether it could have chosen to address the substance of the law instead of declaring an inability to decide based on formal grounds. The court identified a significant formal defect: the Speaker of the House submitted a referral accompanied by a report on preparatory works rather than a compliant copy of the law in question. While the responsibility for this oversight rests primarily with the referring body, the court, comprised of esteemed constitutional law scholars, should recognize the importance of proactive measures. It might have been beneficial for the court to notify the referring body to rectify the procedural shortcomings, similar to provisions in civil procedure law that allow for notifications before dismissing a case due to procedural noncompliance. Although the civil procedure law does not apply before the Constitutional Court, there are no prohibitions against adopting such measures to facilitate a positive judicial role in dispute management. This could have enabled the court to address the documentation deficiencies at the outset rather than focusing on procedural discussions that could have led to a more substantive examination of the law's constitutionality.
Ultimately, the delay in decision-making has resulted in wasted legislative and judicial time, contradicting the constitutional requirement for timely rulings as outlined in Article 120 of the Constitution, which mandates that judicial decisions should be rendered within a reasonable timeframe.
As reported by klamkom.com.
