The Moroccan elections of 2026 have significantly reshaped the political landscape within the House of Representatives, yet they have not resulted in a corresponding expansion in the base of political participation. The rise of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) to the forefront, the considerable decline of the National Rally of Independents (RNI), and the notable resurgence of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) have created a new party map that cannot be understood solely by the number of seats won. Instead, this realignment is attributed to a complex interplay of factors including the volume of votes received, organizational strength, electoral geography, local candidate influence, and the rules governing the translation of votes into parliamentary seats. This nuanced analysis is explored in the research paper titled "Morocco's 2026 Legislative Elections: Implications of the Results and Reshaping the Political Landscape" by Abdelrafi Zannoun, a research fellow at the Moroccan Policy Analysis Institute, which delves into the fundamental nature of the changes in the balance of power. It raises critical questions about whether the elections merely rearranged party positions or if they also impacted the mechanisms of electoral power production, parliamentary representation, coalition building, and political influence.
The elections occurred against a backdrop marked by a paradoxical political and social environment characterized by the expansion of "social state" entitlements and the acceleration of major investment projects on one hand, juxtaposed with pressures on purchasing power, employment, and the quality of public services on the other. While the previous government benefitted from a broad parliamentary majority that provided numerical stability, this institutional presence did not translate into similar social engagement, particularly amidst challenges related to the parties' abilities to renew their frameworks for social engagement and mediation, and to establish more stable relationships with diverse social groups, especially the youth.
From Campaign to Polls: How Power Dynamics Have Changed
The 2026 elections did not break away from the electoral engineering established since the 2021 elections; the system of proportional representation, the abolition of the electoral threshold, and the calculation of the electoral quotient based on registered voters rather than actual voters continued. The distribution of remaining seats according to the largest remainder rule contributed to broader party representation and reduced the monopolization of seats by major parties, while simultaneously intensifying competition among candidates with local influence, leading to the phenomenon of candidates switching parties becoming a significant topic in election discourse.
The House of Representatives remains composed of 395 members, including 305 from local districts and 90 from regional districts designated for women. The 2026 reforms also aimed to facilitate youth participation in the electoral race, especially in light of the resurgence of demands from Generation Z protests. The eligibility criteria for independent candidates under 35 years of age were eased, requiring at least 200 signatures for each designated seat, along with financial support covering up to 75% of qualifying youth campaign expenses. Additionally, the criteria for disqualification related to election integrity crimes were expanded, and the campaign expenditure ceiling was raised to 600,000 dirhams, with stricter requirements for spending declarations and funding oversight.
Issues such as unemployment, social inequality, and regional disparities dominated the electoral programs; however, the intense focus on these issues did not result in substantial differences among the previous ruling parties regarding the general policy directions. Their platforms intersected on core themes such as reinforcing the social state, reforming health and education, stimulating investment and employment, enhancing food and water security, and completing infrastructure projects related to the 2030 World Cup.
In contrast, some opposition forces attempted to shift the competition from policy differences to questioning the political and institutional environment that shapes these policies. The PJD combined social issues with calls for political reform and the consolidation of democratic choices, while the Progress and Socialism Party linked its economic and social demands to the expansion of freedoms, strengthening state institutions, and ethical governance. Meanwhile, the leftist coalition framed its proposals within a broader context of reforming the relationship between the state and society.
This differentiation was reflected in the electoral discourse, with the PJD relying on organizational re-mobilization and personalizing its message, emphasizing issues of corruption, illicit enrichment, and conflicts of interest. The Progress and Socialism Party called for "punitive voting" to hold the ruling coalition accountable for its record, while the leftist coalition focused on the effective separation of powers and more radical measures to achieve social justice.
The previous ruling coalition did not enter the campaign as a unified block defending a common governmental record. The RNI defended its five-year governance outcomes, while PAM and the Istiqlal Party sought to distance themselves from certain decisions that had sparked social discontent. Consequently, the campaign evolved into a competition among former government partners over the distribution of responsibility for its outcomes, rather than merely a confrontation between the majority and the opposition.
Social media played a significant role during the campaigns, whether in shaping the images of leaders and candidates or disseminating messages and responding to adversaries. However, this digital presence did not automatically translate into votes; the outcome remained closely tied to the parties' and candidates' abilities to convert online engagement into genuine mobilization within electoral districts.
One of the key ideas presented in the paper is the differentiation among three levels of electoral power: voting power, measured by the number of votes; parliamentary power, gauged by the number of seats; and coalition power, determined by a party's position in government formation negotiations. These levels do not necessarily align; a party may lose some of its votes while increasing its number of seats, and another party may hold a large parliamentary bloc without it necessarily translating to equivalent weight in the government formation process.
By this measure, the 2026 elections clearly altered the ranking of political parties. The PAM moved from second to first place, increasing its seat count from 87 to 97, while the RNI experienced the largest decline, dropping from 102 to 66 seats. The Istiqlal Party lost 16 seats, settling at 65, while the PJD made a significant comeback, rising from 13 to 54 seats, reclaiming a vital part of its parliamentary weight after its decline in the 2021 elections.
However, a comparison of the vote counts reveals a more complex picture. The PJD's local district votes surged from 322,758 in 2021 to 696,031 in 2026, representing an increase of approximately 115.7%. In contrast, the RNI saw its votes plummet from 2,099,036 to 718,630, a dramatic decrease of about 65.8%. PAM and the Istiqlal Party also faced declines of around 25.5% and 41.2%, respectively.
This leads to one of the most striking paradoxes of the results: PAM topped the parliament and increased its seat count despite a decline in its voting bloc. This paradox highlights the impact of electoral engineering, vote distribution, and electoral geography on determining the final outcome, confirming that a ranking of parties solely based on seats does not provide a complete picture of the balance of power.
Moreover, the total number of seats held by the three parties that formed the previous government dropped from 270 in 2021 to 228 in 2026, a difference of 42 seats. However, collectively, they maintained the mathematical capability to surpass the absolute majority threshold of 198 seats.
The paper argues that these results cannot simply be reduced to an "electoral punishment" for the previous government. If voters had treated the three parties as a unified bloc accountable for their collective record, the decline would have been more uniform among them. Yet, a significant portion of the criticism regarding rising costs and conflicts of interest has targeted the RNI and its Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, while PAM attempted to distance itself during the campaign from certain governmental decisions that had provoked social dissatisfaction. Thus, the results were shaped by political performance, organizational capacity, local candidate influence, and the effectiveness of mobilization networks.
However, the figure that shifts the interpretation of the entire election is the voter turnout rate, which plummeted from 50.18% in 2021 to 38.02% in 2026. Not only did the participation rate decline, but the number of registered voters also shrank from approximately 17.5 million to 15.8 million, a drop of around 1.7 million registrants. With these two trends combined, the number of voters decreased from about 8.8 million to nearly six million.
The paper does not simplify this voter apathy as an unspoken political protest but links it to various factors, primarily the waning appeal of party offerings and the widening gap between social transformations and the tools of framing and mediation. The low electoral engagement among youth is a revealing aspect of the problem; individuals aged 18 to 24 constituted only about 4% of the total registrants.
Consequently, the decrease in participation itself becomes an influential factor in the outcome; as the voter base narrows, the importance of parties' capabilities to mobilize the most willing voters to head to the polls increases. This interplay of factors demonstrates the intricate dynamics at play in Morocco's electoral process and its significance for the future political landscape.
As reported by aljazeera.net.
