The Moroccan elections of 2026 have notably reshaped the political landscape within the House of Representatives, yet they have not resulted in a parallel broadening of political participation. The rise of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) to the forefront, the significant decline of the National Rally of Independents (RNI), and the remarkable comeback of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) have created a new political map that cannot be solely interpreted through the lens of seat allocations. Instead, it is influenced by a multitude of interconnected factors, including the volume of votes, organizational strength, electoral geography, local candidate influence, and the rules governing the transformation of votes into parliamentary seats.
The research paper titled "Morocco's 2026 Legislative Elections: Implications of the Results and Political Landscape Restructuring" by Abdel-Rafiq Znoun, a researcher at the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, delves into these transitions by raising questions that extend beyond merely identifying the winner of the September 23, 2026 elections. It seeks to explore the nature of the changes in power dynamics—whether the elections merely rearranged party positions or if their impact extended to the mechanisms of producing electoral power, translating it into parliamentary representation, and fostering alliances while influencing political decision-making.
The Campaign to the Polls: How Power Dynamics Shifted
The 2026 elections did not mark a break from the electoral architecture that had been established since the 2021 vote; the system of proportional representation remained, alongside the elimination of the electoral threshold and the calculation of the electoral quotient based on registered voters rather than those who actually voted. The remaining seats were allocated using the largest remainder method, which contributed to broadening party representation and minimizing the monopoly of major powers over parliamentary seats. However, it also intensified competition among candidates with local influence, leading to a notable discussion around the movement of elected officials between parties, becoming a significant topic in the electoral discourse.
The House of Representatives retained its 395 members, comprised of 305 representatives from local constituencies and 90 from regional districts designated for women. The 2026 reforms also aimed to facilitate youth participation in the electoral process, especially following the protests from Generation Z that brought forward their demands. Conditions for independent candidacy were eased for those under 35, necessitating at least 200 signatures for each seat in the district, along with financial support amounting to approximately 75% of campaign expenses for qualifying youth candidates. Additionally, disqualifications related to crimes affecting electoral integrity expanded, and the ceiling for campaign expenses increased to 600,000 dirhams, with stricter requirements for expenditure declarations and funding monitoring.
Unemployment, social inequality, and regional disparities emerged prominently in the electoral programs, yet the intense focus on these issues did not yield significant differences among the previous majority parties regarding general policy directions. Their platforms converged around reinforcing the social state, reforming health and education, promoting investment and employment, enhancing water and food security, and completing infrastructure connected to the 2030 World Cup.
Conversely, some opposition forces attempted to shift the competition from policy differences to questioning the political and institutional environment shaping these policies. The PJD combined social issues with calls for political reform and reinforcing democratic choices, while the Progress and Socialism Party linked its economic and social demands to the expansion of freedoms, strengthening state institutions, and promoting public ethics. The Left Alliance framed its proposals within a broader context of reforming state-society relations.
This distinction was reflected in the electoral rhetoric. The PJD focused on organizational reinvigoration and personalized discourse, emphasizing issues of corruption, illicit enrichment, and conflicts of interest. Meanwhile, the Progress and Socialism Party called for a "punitive vote" to hold majority components accountable for their record, while the Left Alliance emphasized the actual separation of powers and more radical measures to achieve social justice.
The previous majority parties did not enter the campaign as a unified bloc defending a shared governmental record. The RNI defended its five-year governance achievements, while PAM and the Istiqlal Party sought to create greater distance from specific choices that had sparked social discontent. Thus, part of the campaign evolved into a contest among former government partners over the distribution of responsibility for their collective record, rather than merely a face-off between the majority and the opposition.
Social media played a significant role in the campaigns, from crafting images of leaders and candidates to disseminating messages and countering opponents, yet it did not diminish the importance of ground-level activities. Digital presence does not automatically translate into votes; the outcome remained tied to the parties’ and candidates’ ability to convert online engagement into tangible mobilization within electoral constituencies.
One of the crucial insights of the research paper is the distinction between three levels of electoral power: voting power, measured by the number of votes; parliamentary power, indicated by the number of seats; and coalition power, determined by the party's position in government formation negotiations. These levels do not necessarily align; a party may lose a portion of its votes while increasing its number of seats, and another party may hold a substantial parliamentary block without it translating into the same weight in the government formation process.
By this measure, the 2026 elections resulted in a clear alteration in party rankings. PAM rose from second to first place, increasing its seat count from 87 to 97, while RNI experienced the largest decline, dropping from 102 to 66 seats. The Istiqlal Party lost 16 seats, settling at 65, while PJD made a significant comeback, jumping from 13 to 54 seats, regaining a crucial portion of its parliamentary weight after its decline in the 2021 elections.
However, a comparison of votes reveals a more complex picture. PJD's share in local constituencies surged from 322,758 votes in 2021 to 696,031 votes in 2026, marking an increase of approximately 115.7%. In contrast, RNI's total plummeted from 2,099,036 to 718,630 votes, a staggering decrease of about 65.8%. PAM also saw a decline of around 25.5%, while Istiqlal faced a drop of approximately 41.2%.
One of the most striking paradoxes of the results is PAM's parliamentary supremacy and increased seat count despite a decrease in its voting bloc. This paradox underscores the impact of electoral engineering, vote distribution, and electoral geography in shaping the final outcome, reinforcing the notion that ranking parties solely by seat count does not provide a complete picture of power dynamics.
The total number of seats held by the three parties that formed the previous government dropped from 270 in 2021 to 228 in 2026, a shortfall of 42 seats. Nevertheless, they collectively maintained the numerical ability to surpass the absolute majority threshold of 198 seats.
The paper posits that these results cannot simply be reduced to an "electoral punishment" of the previous government. Had voters perceived its three parties as a unified block accountable for their record, the decline would have been more closely aligned among them. However, much of the criticism regarding inflation and conflicts of interest targeted RNI and Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, while PAM sought during the campaign to distance itself from some governmental choices that had provoked social discontent. Thus, a blend of political performance, organizational capacity, local candidate influence, and effective mobilization networks intertwined in determining the results.
Nevertheless, the most significant figure altering the perspective on the entire election is the voter turnout rate, which plummeted from 50.18% in 2021 to 38.02% in 2026. It was not just the turnout rate that declined; the number of registered voters fell from approximately 17.5 million to 15.8 million, a drop of nearly 1.7 million registrants. With both phenomena converging, the number of voters decreased from about 8.8 million to nearly six million.
This paper does not solely frame this withdrawal as an unannounced political protest; it connects it to various factors, most notably the declining appeal of party offerings and the widening gap between social transformations and the tools of structuring and mediation. The lack of electoral engagement among youth indicates part of the problem; individuals aged 18 to 24 represented only about 4% of the total registrants.
Thus, the decreased participation itself becomes an influential factor in the outcome; as the voter base narrows, the importance of parties' ability to mobilize the most willing voters to head to the polls increases.
As reported by aljazeera.net.
