The recent announcement from the United States regarding the initiation of the "Second Phase" of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza has placed Morocco at a significant strategic crossroads. Official estimates from Washington indicate that Morocco, alongside Indonesia, is at the forefront of the list of candidates to lead the proposed "International Stabilization Force" in the region. This development, highlighted by Axios on January 14, 2026, marks a transformative shift in Morocco's role from traditional diplomatic and humanitarian support to a direct security involvement in post-war arrangements. This shift is bolstered by an increasing military coordination with the United States and Israel, enabling Morocco to transcend its usual regional roles and engage operatively in one of the most complex security scenarios on the global stage.
Steve Witkoff, the U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, announced the unveiling of the "Second Phase," which represents a turning point in a conflict that has persisted for two years. According to U.S. perspectives unveiled by Axios reports and White House officials, this phase aims primarily to prevent the total collapse of the fragile truce established in October 2025. Washington's vision extends beyond merely securing a tactical ceasefire; it seeks to impose a new administrative and security reality based on three pillars: the formation of a technocratic Palestinian government, the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army from populated centers, and the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) under a UN mandate as articulated in Resolution 2803.
In this context, Morocco emerges as a pivotal player, balancing elements of both "soft power" and "hard power." The choice of Washington to select Morocco and Indonesia to lead this force was not arbitrary; both countries hold significant weight within the Islamic world, providing the force with a "moral" and Arab-Islamic legitimacy that potential Western forces would lack. Concurrently, Morocco has established robust security and diplomatic ties with both Israel and the United States, making it an acceptable partner for Israeli security circles, which demand the presence of "reliable" forces to fill the security vacuum following their withdrawal.
To understand Morocco's readiness for this role, one must analyze the events of January 2, 2026, in Tel Aviv. The third meeting of the Joint Military Committee between the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces and the Israeli Defense Forces was not merely a routine encounter; it represented a qualitative leap in the cooperative philosophy between the two sides. The signing of the "Joint Action Plan for 2026" signifies a transition from transactional relations—characterized by the purchase of drones, air defense systems, and artillery—to an institutional relationship based on joint strategic planning and capacity building.
Reports suggest that discussions focused on integrating combat doctrines, sharing experiences in urban warfare, and countering unconventional threats—skills essential for any force operating in the complex environment of Gaza. Israel now regards Morocco as its most important security ally in Africa and a strategic gateway, viewing the Moroccan military presence in Gaza as a security guarantee, given the high level of coordination between their respective military staffs and intelligence services. This cooperation alleviates Israel's usual concerns regarding international forces, as Tel Aviv ensures direct and effective communication channels with Moroccan command, backed by five years of trust-building since the Abraham Accords.
Additionally, previous training during the "African Lion" exercises hosted by Morocco in early 2025, which included joint urban combat and tunnel assault drills between Israeli Golani Brigade soldiers and a Moroccan joint force composed of Special Forces and the Royal Gendarmerie's Intervention and Security Groups (GSI), further solidifies this partnership. The Gendarmerie, acting as military police within the Royal Armed Forces, could also participate within the Moroccan contingent in Gaza.
On an economic and strategic level, this cooperation cannot be dissociated from the mutual interests that have strengthened despite the ongoing war. Morocco benefits from Israeli agricultural and water technology, while Israel seeks to secure Moroccan phosphate supply chains. This intertwined network of interests creates a solid foundation for a political and military decision of the magnitude required to participate in the Gaza force, where Morocco utilizes this role to bolster its position regarding the Sahara issue, consolidating recognition from major powers of its sovereignty and its role as an essential generator of regional stability.
The political cover for this military mission lies within the "Peace Council" promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump, which is expected to include 15 global leaders overseeing the transition period. The appointment of Nickolay Mladenov, a former UN envoy and expert in Palestinian politics, as a potential coordinator of this council reflects a U.S. desire to internationalize the administration of Gaza and remove control from armed factions and the current authority. UN Resolution 2803, drafted by Washington, grants international legitimacy to this approach, authorizing the international force to undertake tasks that extend beyond traditional security maintenance to include "disarmament" and "destruction of military infrastructure."
This specific point is the "mine" of the agreement. While Washington speaks of a non-partisan technocratic government, the reality on the ground clashes with the categorical rejection from Hamas and Islamic Jihad of disarmament principles or acceptance of "international tutelage." Statements from Palestinian factions suggest that the international force, should it proceed with disarmament of the resistance, would be viewed as a proxy occupying force and a partner of Israel. This places Moroccan and Indonesian forces before a perilous operational challenge: How to execute the mandate of "stabilization" without entering into direct armed confrontation with Palestinian factions that still possess combat capabilities despite two years of war? Will the mission of "peacekeeping" transform into one of "peace enforcement" by force?
On the ground, Moroccan forces will confront an extraordinarily complex humanitarian and logistical reality. Despite the UN's announcement of a slight improvement in food supplies and the meeting of minimal nutritional needs for the first time since 2023, the housing crisis remains the greatest challenge. Hundreds of thousands of Gazans are living in dilapidated tents amid a harsh winter, under the continued Israeli blockade that prevents the entry of large tents and necessary reconstruction materials under the pretext of "dual use."
The international force will not only be responsible for security but will also be expected to ensure a safe environment for reconstruction operations that will take years. This implies that Moroccan soldiers will operate among the ruins of completely destroyed cities, amidst a population suffering from immense psychological and physical trauma, and in an environment lacking the most basic infrastructures. Compounding this challenge are the ongoing Israeli violations of the ceasefire, as the Israeli air force continues to execute attacks under the pretext of targeting armed cells, making the international force susceptible to "friendly fire" or finding itself in active combat zones.
Morocco's involvement in the "Second Phase" and the deployment of troops to Gaza reflects a significant self-confidence on the part of decision-makers in Rabat, as well as a desire to engage on the international stage. This role grants Morocco substantial diplomatic influence in Washington, Tel Aviv, and Brussels, reinforcing its position as a reliable security partner capable of exporting security beyond its borders. Moreover, success in this mission could accelerate the pace of international recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara as part of a comprehensive agreement to reorder the region.
However, the risks remain severe. The military mission in Gaza is not a walk in the park; it is an immersion into a highly volatile operational environment where the line between "peacekeeping" and "combat" is blurred, especially given the factions' insistence on maintaining their arms. The success of Morocco in this mission will largely depend on its ability to carefully balance its security commitments with its international partners (the U.S. and Israel) and its image and position in the Arab and Islamic public consciousness as a defender of the Palestinian cause. Any misstep leading to confrontation with the Palestinians could cost Rabat significant political capital, not only abroad but also within Morocco itself, where the Palestinian cause is a red line for a broad spectrum of society, potentially igniting unrest against the monarchical regime. Meanwhile, passive neutrality could lead to a clash with the U.S.-Israeli vision for the "day after" the war. This presents a true test for Moroccan military and diplomatic doctrine in one of the most volatile areas of the world. (Alex Ribeiro)
As reported by defensa.com.
