Less than a month after the massive arrival of tens of thousands of migrants in Ceuta, new Moroccan statements regarding the Spanish enclaves have reignited tensions with Madrid. Concurrently, the European Union is considering bolstering its financial support to Morocco for border management. This sequence of events brings to the forefront an accusation previously made during the 2021 crisis: the potential use of migratory pressure as a diplomatic negotiation tool.
The scene unfolded on August 24, 2026, at the Royal Palace in Rabat. During a religious ceremony presided over by King Mohammed VI, Morocco's Minister of Habous and Islamic Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq, spoke of a "sacred struggle" aimed at "liberating occupied cities." His remarks, which referenced Ceuta and Melilla through the history of several religious figures from Ceuta, immediately captured attention in Spain.
The political significance of this moment lies as much in the words used as in the context in which they were delivered. Ahmed Toufiq was addressing not only Mohammed VI but also Crown Prince Moulay Hassan and Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch. Nevertheless, his speech does not signify an announcement of a new diplomatic doctrine; no formal change in Morocco's position regarding the two territories has been communicated by the Foreign Ministry.
Madrid swiftly reaffirmed its stance. "Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish," declared government spokesperson Elma Saiz. The Spanish government regards both cities as integral parts of its territory and that of the European Union, a position that has been formally conveyed to Rabat following several recent Moroccan statements.
These positions come at a time when Ceuta is still struggling to cope with the aftermath of the migration crisis of July 30. Approximately **72,000 people** crossed the border illegally from Morocco on that day, according to Spanish estimates cited by various European sources. The human toll was later reassessed to at least **82 deaths on the Spanish side and 14 in Morocco**, while several thousand migrants remained in the enclave weeks later.
The 2021 Precedent Fuels Suspicions
The crisis in July inevitably recalls the events of May 2021. At that time, around 8,000 people entered Ceuta in just two days following an apparent easing of Moroccan controls. This incident had erupted amidst a diplomatic crisis triggered by Spain's hosting of Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, who had come for medical treatment.
A Moroccan government member suggested a connection between the two events. Mustapha Ramid, the Minister of State for Human Rights, stated that Morocco had the right to ease its efforts following the reception of Brahim Ghali, asserting that Madrid needed to understand that "underestimating Morocco is costly." The Spanish Minister of Defense, Margarita Robles, responded by directly accusing Rabat of "blackmail." She criticized Moroccan authorities for allowing thousands of people, including minors, to attempt to reach Ceuta by swimming or crossing the border fence. "We will not accept any blackmail," she stated on Spanish public radio RNE.
Five years later, the comparison has its limits. Currently, there are no public elements to establish that Moroccan authorities organized or intentionally triggered the influx on July 30, 2026. On the ground, Moroccan forces used water cannons, riot control measures, and reinforcements to attempt to contain the crossings. Following the crisis, Rabat also strengthened its operations near Ceuta and made arrests when new calls to cross the border circulated on social media.
Moreover, Morocco explicitly rejects the idea of instrumentalization. A source from the Moroccan Foreign Ministry stated in early August that the kingdom was acting "neither under pressure, nor blackmail, nor quid pro quo." Rabat claims to have alerted Madrid prior to the crisis about the consequences of a Spanish court decision limiting the immediate return possibilities for migrants intercepted at sea. According to Moroccan authorities, this development weakened the deterrent effect of border measures and was exploited by smuggling networks.
Hundreds of Millions of Euros at the Heart of Migration Cooperation
Questions are now shifting towards Brussels. Morocco has benefited from significant European funding for migration management, border surveillance, combating smuggling networks, and return policies over recent years. According to figures provided by the European Commission to Euronews, **€222 million** has been committed between 2021 and 2024 for migration cooperation with Rabat. Furthermore, Brussels plans an additional **€190 million** by the end of the current budget framework in 2027, bringing the total to over **€400 million** for the period in question.
This cooperation extends beyond surveillance equipment. The European Union launched a €152 million budget program in 2023 dedicated to managing migration in Morocco, as part of a broader set of cooperation programs that also focus on economic reforms and ecological transition.
The Ceuta crisis occurs at a time when Brussels and Rabat are negotiating a new **strategic and comprehensive partnership**, expected by the end of the year. According to several European officials interviewed by Euronews, the events of July are now leading the EU to strengthen the migration, security, and border control aspects of the future agreement.
Ursula von der Leyen herself has mentioned the need to improve border management, early warning mechanisms, and the "technical and financial" support provided to Morocco. Meanwhile, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, stated that the EU must utilize all its leverage to achieve sustainable cooperation from Rabat, highlighting the vulnerability created by European dependence on neighboring countries regarding migration.
The issue transcends the July 30 crisis alone. Geography places Morocco in a unique position: it controls essential land and maritime routes leading to Spain and, consequently, the European Union. For Brussels and Madrid, cooperation with Rabat is thus a central element in managing irregular arrivals. For Morocco, this situation mechanically enhances its leverage in negotiations not only on migration but also on trade, investments, and political cooperation.
This interdependence fuels suspicion during each crisis. The President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas, accused Moroccan authorities of having "encouraged and permitted" the influx following the July events, while Rabat categorically rejected these accusations. The European Commission has refrained from directly attributing responsibility to the Moroccan government.
Madrid's stance remains cautious as well. During his visit to Ceuta on July 31, Pedro Sánchez spoke of a "violation" and an "attack on Spanish territorial integrity," while avoiding blaming Morocco. Instead, he emphasized the cooperation of Moroccan authorities in organizing returns and attributed the onset of the crisis to the interpretation of a Spanish judicial decision by migrant trafficking networks.
The timeline is nonetheless politically sensitive. An unprecedented migration crisis strikes Ceuta; Brussels subsequently considers strengthening its financial and security support to Morocco; and then several Moroccan officials publicly reintroduce the sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla into the debate. These elements do not demonstrate the existence of a coordinated mechanism by Rabat to obtain European concessions. However, they do explain why the accusation of "migratory blackmail," which was officially made by Madrid in 2021, resurfaces in the European debate.
For the European Union, the challenge now lies in maintaining essential cooperation with Morocco without creating a relationship where migration control becomes a disproportionate negotiation lever. For Rabat, the inverse challenge exists: to continue to enhance its role as a strategic partner without endorsing the notion that the stability of the European border depends on political or financial concessions.
As reported by beninwebtv.com.
