Unraveling a Historical Tapestry
Since Morocco gained its independence in 1956, its relationship with Spain has transcended mere geographical proximity, characterized by a narrow strait of about 14 kilometers. Instead, it has been deeply influenced by a colonial legacy that remains unresolved in numerous aspects. As Morocco gradually reclaimed territories that were once under Spanish control, issues surrounding the Sahara, Ceuta, Melilla, and the Mediterranean islands have remained relevant to varying degrees. Declassified American documents and WikiLeaks cables reveal that many crises, which appeared surprising to the public, have been under discussion in private circles for decades.
One of the most significant documents dates back to July 30, 1956, just months after Morocco's independence. This secret memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), now archived in the U.S. Department of State, quotes King Mohammed V's statements indicating that Morocco and its government would exert every effort to regain sovereignty over Moroccan territories, specifically naming Sidi Ifni, the Gold Valley, Melilla, and Ceuta, along with correcting borders with Algeria. This document is crucial as it substantiates Morocco's claims to Ceuta and Melilla as rooted in its national identity since the early days of independence, evolving into an open crisis over the territories still held by Spain.
In 1957, the U.S. State Department noted a deterioration in relations due to conflicts between the Moroccan Liberation Army and Spanish forces in Sidi Ifni, highlighting that Mohammed V tasked his ambassador in Madrid with demanding negotiations to facilitate the return of the region. Following the Ifni and Sahara Wars, Morocco regained the territory of Tarfaya in 1958, and subsequently, Sidi Ifni was reestablished under Moroccan sovereignty in 1969 through the Treaty of Fes. The United Nations records that the transfer of authority occurred on June 30, 1969, marking the territory as part of the Kingdom of Morocco from that date.
Continuing Tensions and Diplomatic Maneuvering
However, the most significant contention shifted to the Sahara. An American intelligence document from 1974 described Morocco as the most active party in claiming 'Spanish Sahara,' indicating that Rabat regarded the territories it had regained since 1956 merely as part of its historical claims. As the end of Franco's rule approached, the Sahara issue escalated into a severe crisis between the two nations. On October 3, 1975, CIA Director William Colby sent a memorandum to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, warning that information had reached Washington regarding King Hassan II's decision to enter the Sahara, signaling the potential for a 'serious conflict' with Spanish forces and the possibility of Algeria intervening.
Further records reveal that Hassan II was explicit with Kissinger about his rejection of an independent state in the Sahara, asserting that Spain had previously left Morocco and would also exit the Sahara. He maintained that Rabat was prepared for confrontation if necessary, although U.S. communications sought to avert war. The Green March and the Madrid Agreement in November 1975 ultimately terminated direct Spanish presence in the region and initiated a new phase of conflict. Interestingly, the recovery of the Sahara temporarily relegated the issues of Ceuta and Melilla to the background, but it did not resolve them. A confidential American cable from Rabat on August 21, 1976, published later by WikiLeaks, indicated that Morocco's preoccupation with the Sahara and improved relations with Spain allowed Hassan II to avoid embarrassing King Juan Carlos during the transition from Franco, thus placing the Ceuta and Melilla issue on the 'back burner.' Nevertheless, the ambassador emphasized that the issue 'remains alive,' with Hassan II publicly committed to their eventual return to Morocco.
By 1979, a sensitive document revealed the complexity of the matter within Spain itself. In April of that year, King Juan Carlos admitted to U.S. envoy Edmund Muskie and Ambassador Terence Todman the possibility of returning Melilla to Morocco relatively soon, while perceiving Ceuta as more complicated due to its Spanish population. He suggested a solution akin to the international status that Tangier once held and expressed concern that Hassan II might initiate a second 'Green March' towards the two cities. Despite not evolving into an official Spanish policy, it indicated that the future of these cities was a topic of discussion even at the highest levels of the Spanish state. Conversely, the Spanish government adopted a more hardline stance; in June 1980, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez informed U.S. President Jimmy Carter that Madrid believed Morocco might pressure Ceuta and Melilla to gain concessions in fishing and trade negotiations. Suárez stated that Spain would respond 'violently' if that occurred, claiming to have military offensive plans ready, to which Carter replied that this implied war, with Suárez confirming, 'Exactly.'
The documentation illustrates how intertwined territorial, fishing, trade, and Sahara issues have been, to the extent that an economic disagreement could escalate into military confrontation. In the early 1990s, both countries sought to frame these issues within a structure capable of containing crises, culminating in the signing of the 'Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation' in Rabat on July 4, 1991. Ironically, the preamble of the treaty acknowledged that the history between the two peoples has been marked by 'contradictory fluctuations,' before establishing regular meetings and political, economic, military, and security cooperation. This new arrangement was practically evident, aiming to postpone sovereignty disputes while expanding shared interests.
Nonetheless, this did not prevent the most serious eruption in July 2002, when the Leila Island became a direct confrontation site at the onset of King Mohammed VI's reign and the Spanish government headed by José María Aznar. Following the entry of Moroccan elements onto the island, Spain executed a military operation to reclaim it, prompting U.S. intervention to avert further escalation. Official correspondence from Secretary of State Colin Powell documented the agreement that restored the status quo prior to the crisis, with the withdrawal of military and government personnel and the removal of flags, and a commitment from both countries to respect their legal positions and resolve disputes peacefully. With the release of WikiLeaks cables in 2010, another facet of the relationship emerged, specifically related to the Sahara. The documents indicated that the Spanish socialist government, despite its publicly balanced rhetoric, had encouraged Rabat since the mid-2000s to develop a 'credible' autonomy plan.
In a 2006 communication, Spanish Ambassador to Rabat Luis Planas informed his U.S. counterpart that Spain would assist Morocco in formulating a serious proposal, while Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos suggested transitioning from terms like 'colonialism, sovereignty, and independence' to 'regionalism, autonomy, and local governance,' taking cues from the Spanish model. Even Ceuta and Melilla re-emerged vigorously in WikiLeaks cables in 2007, following King Juan Carlos's first visit to the occupied cities. One cable explicitly titled 'The Spanish Royal Visit to Ceuta and Melilla Bites Back at Spain' recorded the Moroccan response's surprising strength, catching the Zapatero government off guard. Another cable from Rabat documented King Mohammed VI's reaffirmation of Morocco's commitment to regaining sovereignty over the two cities, alongside his call for 'open and forward-looking dialogue' to preserve relations with Spain.
After the crisis involving the reception of separatist leader Ibrahim Ghali in Spain in 2021 and the subsequent influx of thousands of migrants into Ceuta, relations teetered on the brink of rupture. However, a significant turning point occurred in March 2022 when Pedro Sánchez announced that Spain considers Morocco's autonomy proposal for the Sahara as 'the most serious, realistic, and credible basis' for resolving the dispute. Ironically, WikiLeaks documents confirmed that this orientation had been present within Spanish diplomacy for nearly 15 years before its official declaration. In April 2022, the two nations established a roadmap based on continuous dialogue, refraining from unilateral actions and avoiding crises. Yet, the stability of the relationship did not resolve the historical dispute between the two countries. In August 2026, Moroccan Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi reiterated that Ceuta and Melilla represent a 'historical and geographical right' for Morocco and called for the creation of a dialogue mechanism regarding their future and 'return to the homeland.' Madrid responded with a firm rejection, asserting that the two cities are integral to Spanish sovereignty and territorial integrity within the European Union and that it would not negotiate their sovereignty.
The last seven decades of documents reveal that Moroccan-Spanish relations have never been characterized by stable friendship or permanent enmity; rather, they represent a mutual dependence amidst unresolved historical disputes. Since the late King Mohammed V, Morocco has viewed completing its territorial integrity as a journey that began with independence and continued with the recovery of Tarfaya, Sidi Ifni, and the Sahara, while Ceuta, Melilla, and the nearby islands remain central to Morocco's historical claims. Conversely, Spain maintains that the two cities are a definitive part of its territory. Between these two positions, geography imposes its rules, as trade, migration, security, fisheries, counter-terrorism, investments, and energy make severance costly for both countries. Thus, the documents reveal a recurring pattern since the 1950s, based on territorial and sovereignty disputes, followed by escalation, fear of crossing red lines, mediation, or negotiation, leading to a new phase of cooperation until history resurfaces one of the old files.
As reported by assahifa.com.
