Understanding the Recent Constitutional Controversy in Morocco
In Morocco, some constitutional mistakes do not stem from a lack of knowledge of the text, but rather from the political urgency and haste to surpass it. This, in my opinion, is what is unfolding today after the government led by Fatima Zahra Mansouri approved the draft finance law for the year 2027 on Tuesday, October 20, and submitted it to parliament on the same day, despite not having yet gained the confidence of the House of Representatives. The discussions that have emerged since the appointment of this government have been both fruitful and rich, highlighting that the core issue does not lie in whether the ministers received their powers, or whether the head of government convened a council meeting. The key concern is the approval of a law by a government that has not yet been formally installed and its subsequent referral to a parliament that has not yet recognized it.
The organic law concerning the organization and management of government work, along with the legal status of its members, restricts the new government during this transitional phase to preparing the government program, issuing necessary delegations of authority, and taking urgent measures to ensure the continuity of state interests and the organization of public facilities. The approval of draft laws is explicitly placed outside the scope of permissible actions for the new government before its formal installation.
While it is true that the Constitutional Council, when examining this law in 2015, opened an exceptional window by stating that the application of this prohibition should consider what "emergency situations" might require in terms of legislative or organizational measures, this exception is now the strongest argument for those defending the validity of the government's actions, claiming that October 20 is the legal deadline for submitting the finance law to the House of Representatives. However, even this interpretation does not convert necessity into full governmental authority, nor does it eliminate the distinction between exception and rule, nor does it absolve the responsibility of questioning who created this state of necessity in the first place.
The deadline of October 20 did not appear out of thin air, nor did the state suddenly discover that it had a finance law to submit by this date. The Ministry of Interior, which oversaw the election agenda, was aware of Article 48 of the organic finance law that sets October 20 as the submission deadline. Moreover, the draft budget for 2027 did not originate overnight from the Friday when Mansouri's government was appointed. The preparation of the project began during the tenure of Aziz Akhannouch's government; Minister Nadia Fettah presented the general framework for its preparation and the budgetary programming for the years 2027-2029 to the finance committees in July. Subsequently, in August, the government presidency issued a guiding memorandum that outlined its major priorities. Therefore, the project carried by Fouzi Lekjaa on Tuesday to the council meeting was not the result of three days of work from the new team, and it is unreasonable to expect that a government appointed on Friday night could have worked overnight to create a national budget from scratch.
This raises the question of whether it was necessary to swiftly remove Aziz Akhannouch and his government from the scene, especially if the cost is entering the new government into this constitutional gray area. Why did this occur this time when the government of Benkirane spent its first year operating with a budget prepared and approved by Abbas El Fassi's government, while the government of El Othmani discussed the finance law project that Benkirane's government had submitted to parliament before the elections?
It is true that the previous government was not free from the constraints of approving draft laws, as Article 37 of the organic law prohibits it, and the Constitutional Council also added the necessity exception for caretaker governments. However, the previous government was the one that effectively prepared the project and initiated its course months ago. If the formation of the new government had been delayed by a few days, it could have continued as a caretaker government until the new cabinet was formed, and then we could have considered the possibility of using the necessity exception to finalize a financial procedure that it had owned from the beginning.
The current situation resembles farce more than necessity. A government that has barely been appointed, with some of its ministers not even having a permanent seat to begin their duties, has inherited an almost-ready document, approved it, and referred it to a parliament that has not yet recognized it. One might argue that the outcome is the same, and that the state does not halt and the budget must be submitted on time. This is true from the perspective of institutional continuity, but it does not provide a sufficient answer in a state whose constitution establishes parliamentary installation as a foundational moment for the relationship between the government and the House of Representatives.
The matter is not merely a signature that can be replaced by another. The finance law is the most expressive of governmental policy, determining taxes, expenses, investments, subsidies, financial positions, and translating the social and economic priorities that the government is supposed to present to parliament to gain its confidence. If parliament has not yet granted this confidence, what is the significance of receiving a complete financial project on behalf of a government that has not yet been installed?
Thus, the issue does not relate to the sanctity of a formal procedure or the desire to halt state operations until the representatives conclude their discussions and voting. The entire parliamentary idea relies on the principle that the government does not derive its complete political legitimacy from appointment alone; otherwise, there would be no need for Article 88 of the constitution, which established the principle of installation to ensure that the confidence of the House of Representatives is part of the foundation of executive power itself. All studies addressing this phase have concluded that the appointed government before installation is "politically incapacitated," and that the organic law specifies transitional tasks for it, not to grant it full authority while waiting for the vote.
In a state governed by law, necessity is not a magic word that erases the boundaries drawn by the legislator, especially when it is possible to foresee it in advance. The election date was known, the deadline for submitting the finance law was clear, and the process of forming the government occurred under public scrutiny. It was evident early on that appointing a new government just days before October 20 would place it before one of two undesirable options: either wait for installation and risk missing the finance law deadline, or approve a draft law before completing its political legitimacy. It is only reasonable to question why we were placed in this predicament in the first place.
What would have happened "in God's Kingdom" if Aziz Akhannouch had remained at the head of the caretaker government for four or five additional days until the finance law could be resolved in a constitutionally and legally defensible manner according to the logic of "necessity," allowing the new government to assume its duties without commencing its term embroiled in a conflict with parliament? Would Morocco have ground to a halt? Would the administration have stalled? Or was there a political desire to swiftly sever ties with the previous phase that caused political timing to override constitutional timing this time?
I do not have the answers to the motivations behind this urgency, nor should I invent them. However, the result is that Akhannouch exited promptly, and Mansouri entered even quicker. Between these two rapid transitions, parliament found itself confronted with a government it had not yet granted confidence to, but which had already approved and referred a finance law draft to it. Perhaps removing a Prime Minister who lost an election from the scene was a politically comprehensible move, and it might have been symbolically necessary to get the new executive apparatus underway quickly. Yet, wouldn’t it have been preferable for the outgoing Prime Minister to remain a few additional days knowing he was leaving, rather than burdening a new government from its first week with such a significant constitutional breach? The issue, ultimately, does not lie with Aziz Akhannouch or Fatima Zahra Mansouri. The problem is that parliament, once again, appears to be the weakest link when deadlines collide. This is the real danger.
When exceptions become precedents, we have not only preserved the continuity of the state, but we have fundamentally changed the meaning that the 2011 Constitution sought to impart regarding the notion that the government requires the confidence of parliament before it becomes a fully authorized government.
As reported by thevoice.ma.
