Exploring the Historical Significance of French Military Archives
This series of chronicles is dedicated to the Military Archives of Vincennes and the French documents from between 1850 and 1920 that pertain to both Western and Eastern Sahara. Conceived by Bernard Lugan, Le360 commissioned Karim Serraj to travel to Paris to conduct research in the archives of the Service historique de la Défense. This investigation has uncovered a wealth of firsthand information that has remained untapped by historians and researchers until now. Le360 has decided to fully publish the document used in each chronicle, making it accessible to historians, students, and diplomats, thereby enriching the understanding of this crucial historical period.
The French Dream of Sahara Expansion
In 1890, France had maintained a presence in Algeria for over fifty years but had yet to secure the Saharan borders that separated it from Sub-Saharan Africa. The French envisioned transforming the Sahara into a pivotal component of their African empire, seeking to connect Algeria with Senegal, Niger, and eventually Lake Chad. This coveted territory comprised a series of oases and towns such as Touat, Gourara, Tidikelt, and In-Salah, as highlighted in the unique document presented today. This area has historically been under the authority of the Sultan of Morocco for centuries, making it an integral part of the Cherifian Empire.
Algiers was acutely aware of the necessity to "immediately separate all the populations on the left bank of these valleys from Morocco" before any military advancement could take place. This singular statement carries immense implications, suggesting that the populations of Touat, Gourara, In-Salah, and others must be distanced from Moroccan influence. The anonymous author of the report expressed concerns that rather than submit to French dominion, these populations would prefer to seek immediate protection from Morocco, a reality that was perilously close to fruition. Should the vast region of Touat declare itself Moroccan, it would no longer be feasible to present it to the world as a vacant land ripe for colonization. For an expanding French empire, nothing is more problematic than a populace that opts to remain under the protection of its Sultan. Thus, the adversary to this occupation is clearly identified.
Morocco does not merely represent a distant fiction but is perceived as a potential countermeasure against the incursion into the Sahara's fringes. This perceived threat must be neutralized to prevent any retaliation before even initiating the penetration of the oases. French anxieties extend beyond the hypothetical emergence of a Moroccan army from the desert to threaten occupied Algeria; they are fundamentally rooted in the fear of Cherifian legitimacy and the potential for a colonial push to escalate into an international dispute.
As the Sahara Moroccan landscape transformed in the eyes of Paris from a distant desert to an imperial corridor, several trans-Saharan railway projects were proposed during this pivotal period. These plans aimed to run from Biskra through Touggourt and Ouargla, ultimately reaching Lake Chad. The goal was far more extensive than simply laying tracks; it was about unifying French Africa, converting the desert into a military and commercial thoroughfare, and ensuring continuity between Algeria, West Africa, and Central Africa. The Franco-British convention of August 5, 1890, would recognize France's vast zone of influence extending south of its Mediterranean possessions to the Say-Barroua line, which included Moroccan Sahara. This diplomatic arrangement saw two European powers partitioning African territories they had yet to control, a curious diplomatic habit of dividing lands before engaging with their inhabitants.
Within this context, Moroccan Sahara became crucial. The report bluntly states, "If we do not master the left bank, we must renounce all future relations with Senegal and Upper Niger." The document acknowledges that the ergs make several routes impassable for a heavy column. The Oued Saoura valley emerges as the vital route that leads toward Gourara and Touat. Here, geography reveals its political implications: the left bank of the Saoura is more than just a bank; it acts as the lock on a continental project. Control over the Zousfana-Igli-Saoura axis means holding access between the Southern Oran region and the oases. Should Morocco maintain its grip here, France's empire would be severed; if it is pushed out, the southern route would open up.
In the report titled "Report to the Supreme War Council on the Occupation of Gourara, Touat, and In-Salah," archived in the Military Archives of Vincennes, it is stated that the populations of Touat, sensing the danger of French proximity, sought Moroccan intervention against France. Delegations were received by Moulay Hassan, and new Cherifian authorities were appointed in Touat, replacing the old caids and Moroccan governors who seemed ill-equipped to face the significant challenges ahead. The report also recalls that during international conferences in Marrakech, Moulay Hassan asserted that Touat was an integral part of his empire. While the French document contests this historical truth, it cannot deny its political materiality. This movement toward the Sultan is not merely patriotic; it is also religious and symbolic. French planners, with the ethnocentric brutality of their time, noted, "The people of Touat, Gourara, etc., are Muslims; they will turn to Muslims and not to Christians."
This certainty prompted military leadership to dismiss a small expedition against In-Salah. A column of five or six hundred men could, according to the report, have the opposite effect of what was intended: accelerating the establishment of a Moroccan protectorate. In-Salah, isolated, would become "an unnecessary and worthless trophy"; caravans would circumvent it, while Touat, Gourara, and Tafilalet would strengthen their ties. Therefore, the conquest must be broader, faster, and more encompassing. The aim is not only to occupy but to prevent Moroccan recourse.
One of the most striking passages in the report does not mention rifles or cavalry but rather imagines a negotiation table. If France were to demand that the Sultan renounce Touat, the author predicts, it could open a lengthy series of negotiations and involve European powers. "The English, Germans, and Italians would certainly complicate matters, under the pretext that these populations wish to be Moroccan and not French." The term "under pretext" exposes the logic of Saharan penetration—the potential will of the populations is not recognized as a political fact, let alone a right. Rather, it becomes an awkward argument that European rivals could turn against Paris. France's true fear is not that this assertion is false, but that it is heard.
The report further reveals its own contradiction: "If we order Morocco to respect the independence of these territories, we may feel some scruples about not respecting it ourselves." Rarely has imperial hypocrisy been articulated so succinctly. Paris seeks to prohibit Morocco from asserting its authority in the name of the oases' independence while simultaneously undermining that independence in the name of Algeria's interests. The issue at hand is not moral but rhetorical: how to claim for oneself what is denied to the neighbor without appearing to lack any right to seize a territory?
The solution lies in reducing the time for discussion. "We must not suffer Morocco to establish its suzerainty over In-Salah, Touat, and Gourara," the report asserts. From this, it concludes: "To prevent this, we have no choice but to take the lead, imposing our authority on the populations of these regions." Taking the lead encapsulates the concept of preventive conquest. The goal is to create a fait accompli before Morocco can demonstrate its connections to Eastern Sahara, before the oases can revolt against France, and before European chancelleries can intervene.
The preparation for this endeavor is as much diplomatic as it is military. French Foreign Minister Alexandre Ribot first ensures that Spain will not oppose the occupation project as long as Morocco's formal integrity and the treaty of 1845 are respected. He then requests the War Ministry to prepare the means of action while reserving the right to take necessary precautions against any diplomatic "surprises." Morocco must be kept at a distance from the field, and other powers must be distanced from Morocco. Isolation precedes invasion.
Marginalization then becomes a geographical operation. Governor-General Louis Tirman proposes a strong column to move out from Southern Oran. Its successive objectives would be Gourara, Touat, and then Tidikelt and In-Salah. The route must follow the Oued Zousfana, Igli, and the Oued Saoura. General Philebert adopts the same plan and nearly identical language. The column would descend from Djenien-bou-Rezg toward Zousfana, then Saoura, "always in a manner to separate from Morocco all the populations inhabiting these valleys." The objective is not merely to defeat resistance but to sever relational space. The military corridor must evolve into a moving frontier, with permanent posts envisioned at water points and near significant villages. Supplies would be secured in redoubts, and the railway should extend beyond Aïn-Sefra to ensure access into the Sahara.
El-Goléah is fortified with a garrison of 150 tirailleurs and equipped with meharas to monitor the Chambâa and solidify French influence in the extreme South. The military does not yet speak of a definitive border, but they are establishing the posts, paths, and garrisons that will make it possible.
As reported by fr.le360.ma.
